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Abstract.  We provide a comprehensive analysis of the Portuguese parties and their policy space.  We show 
how and how well the parties have been able to adapt to the changing environment in the party system. Our analyses 
show that, not only are we able check existing static expert assessments of the Portuguese party and policy space, but 
we are also able to track the dynamics of the system. In this way, we expand on what little has been said thus far about 
the Portuguese party system. We conclude with three important ideas. First, we confirm that the Portuguese policy 
space is unidimensional, with the parties lining up from Left to Right, as some but not all experts, have suggested. 
Second,  we propose that the environment of the  Portuguese party system is one of compression, that is, parties have 
been office-seekers in that they have all been approaching the Centre of the political spectrum for a number of reasons 
we explore in detail.  Last, we learn that only through issue dimensions and how parties pronounce themselves on these 
dimensions are the smaller parties able to survive and avoid extinction in the compressing environment of the party 
system. 
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In democracy political electorates and popular control depend on political parties to 
present viable governing options.  It is through the parties and their competitive struggle to gain 
power that democratic theory becomes a reality.  In the midst of increasing pressures for 
innovation, political parties are forced to change how they organize themselves and relate to one 
another within a given political system. In the face of a changing environment in the party 
system, the parties have to adapt in order to survive and flourish.  
Our purpose in this paper is to show how and how well the Portuguese parties have been 
able to adapt.  This is interesting in two regards. First, it is relevant as a theoretical matter because 
we will be observing the parties during a period when they are still young, inexperienced, and, in 
some sense, vulnerable to extinction. Second, it is interesting as a descriptive matter because there 
is not too terribly much information on Portugal and the Portuguese party system.   
Given adaptability as the core theme of the paper, we begin with the context of the 
Portuguese system by describing it,  its parties and their origins and also by speculating about 
how the changing environment has conditioned their behaviour and will continue to condition it 
in the future. We then turn to the critical question of what democratic choice the parties provide 
and how they organise themselves in the policy space. Through a comprehensive analysis of  the 
Portuguese  manifestoes provided by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), which is 
especially designed to pick up on valid and reliable party dynamics (McDonald and Mendes 
2000; Mendes and McDonald 2001a; Volkens 2001), we  provide a picture of what the policy 
space looks like, and more importantly, how party strategic manoeuvering has changed it 
throughout Portugal´s short democratic history.  
We conclude with three important ideas. First, we are able to confirm that the Portuguese 
policy space is unidimensional, with the parties lining up from Left to Right, as some but not all 
experts, have suggested. Second,  we propose that the environment of the Portuguese party 
system is one of compression, that is, parties have been office-seekers in that they have all been 
approaching the Centre of the political spectrum for a number of reasons we explore below in 
detail. Finally, we learn that only through issue dimensions and how parties pronounce 
themselves on these dimensions are the smaller parties able to survive in the contracting 
environment of the party system. 
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Historical and Socio-Economic Background 
Living in Portugal today is not quite what it used to be a quarter of a century ago. The 
Portuguese are more well off, more educated, sophisticated, well-dressed, and  confident about 
the future with a GDP per capita that is now more than two thirds of the EU average compared to 
15 years ago when it was only half the EU average (The Economist 2001). 
This change in the Portuguese way of life is even more noticeable when we recall how 
the Portuguese were struggling 15 years ago amidst skyrocketing inflation rates, rampant 
unemployment, and chaotic public finance.  It took two IMF interventions, newfound governance 
stability, and entry into the EU to salvage the fledgling young democracy. It is hard to believe that 
it was once one of two major world powers. As a daring and courageous nation, they won their 
independence from Spain in the mid 12th century and built an empire from the small lot of land 
handed down from Spain and expanded south to the Mediterranean.  
As the saying goes, that was then and this is now. It is true, Portugal ranks far from where 
it once did, but it is making comeback in wide strides. A series of economic, political, and natural 
disasters in 18th and 19th centuries—the earthquake 1755 destroying Lisbon, the Napoleonic 
invasion and the loss of Brazil as their major colony, and civil war in the late nineteenth 
century—very contributing to an already crumbling empire. The fifty-year dictatorship in the 20th 
century finally finished it off. That is why in Portugal the national pride tends to focus on the 
Portuguese heritage around the time of the maritime discoveries. Growing up in Portugal, one is 
not allowed to forget the heroic feats at sea that set famous Portuguese sailors in stone, such as 
Vasco da Gama, Ferdinand Magellan, Pedro Cabral, and Bartolomeu Dias to name a few of the 
more reknown discoverers. These daring and pioneering seamen  introduced the Western world to 
new and exciting places.  
Today, just 25 years since the bloodless Revolução dos Cravos or the Revolution of the 
Carnations and the democratic victory over the Estado Novo, the Portuguese are making a eye-
opening comeback. As the Portuguese would say, “Estamos a sair da casca”.  They are coming out 
of their shell and their making way, headway that is.   
 
Historical Background  
The adoption of the democratic Constitution of 1976, marked the 4th chapter in 20th 
century political life: the Monarchy, the First Republic, the dictatorship in the Estado Novo, and 
democracy. Manuel II was the last king of the Portuguese monarchy ending in 1910 (Magone 
1997, 17). His father´s reign, Carlos I, was a struggling one with increasing political and social 
unrest and conflict between the republican and the monarchic forces. When Carlos I was 
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assassinated in Lisbon in 1908, Manuel II took one last stab at salvaging the monarchical 
traditions by restoring the constitutional government.  It was too late, however. The  republican 
movements were already strongly mobilized and ready to take charge. On October 5th 1910 that is 
what they did. The monarchy was officially replaced by a republican regime after almost 800 
years and four monarchical dynasties.  
The First Republic, as it was called, lasted from 1910 to 1926. It was an uneasy era, 
plagued with economic turmoil and political volatility (Bruneau 1997) . A total of forty prime 
ministers took office for an average duration of government of about four months. Matters 
became particularly bleak when Portugal´s external political relations forced them into the WWI. 
Portugal honored its alliance with Britain and seized German ships in Lisbon’s harbor in 1916.  
This context got worse with corruption and mismanagement. All this terminated in May 1926, 
when a military coup led by General Oscar Fragoso Carmona deposed the government and 
assumed the power.  In the Presidential elections of 1928 General Carmona was inducted into 
office and appointed António Oliveira Salazar as finance minister, who imposed stringent 
conditions on accepting the position (Schmitter 1979). With ever growing popularity and power, 
Salazar became Prime Minister in 1932 and virtually the sole power holder.   The União Nacional 
(National Union) was the sole party of the Portuguese system. The Prime Minister became the 
sole decisionmaker of a corporatist regime that was administratively and politically centralized 
under the authoritarian thumb Salazar.  
Despite some adjustments over time, the nature of the authoritarian regime did not change 
much. However, two events helped lead to its downfall in 1974.  During the 1950s, there was 
some attempt to make the regime appear to be more democratic in the eyes of the outside world. 
An opposition candidate, General Humberto Delgado was allowed to run for the President in 
1958. Although the candidate was ultimately defeated by the government’s candidate, General 
Américo Tomás, it proved to be a somewhat of a scare.  The election of 1958 proved to be a key 
event in the mobilization of the pro-democratic, oppositionist movements. It was enough to 
prompt the government to change the electoral rule so that the President would be indirectly 
elected by the National Assembly, rather than through direct suffrage.   
The Portuguese colonial wars in Africa also proved to be destructive to the Estado Novo. 
Portugal was among the last nations still hanging on to colonies in the post WWII era.  The 
eruption of wars for independence in three of the five African territories or the Províncias 
Ultramarinas as they were called (Overseas Provinces): Angola, São Tomé e Principe, Cabo 
Verde, Mozambique, and the Portuguese Guinea.  In 1961, the Portuguese let go of its Indian 
territories—of Goa, Damão, and Diu—with no Portuguese resistance.  But in Africa the rise of 
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independence movements was more dramatic. Salazar did not want to let go of these colonies. 
Soon the Portuguese were forced to fight on three fronts: beginning in 1961 in Angola, in 1962 in 
the Portuguese Guinea, and in 1964 in Mozambique. During much of the 60s, Portugal became 
more and more isolated and criticized by the international community. 
 In the meantime, the Portuguese armed forced gained  newfound strength and mobilization 
that provided the necessary human power to set repressed anti-Estado Novo discontent into motion.  
On April 25th 1974, the Capitães de Abril  (Movement of Captains) overthrew the government with 
ease and paved the way for democracy, decolonisation, and development (Graham and Makler 
1979).  “The liberation of Portugal from dictatorship, oppression and colonization represent a 
revolutionary change and an historic new beginning in Portuguese society.” (Preamble of 
Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 1976, 4th revision). 
 
Social Structure  
The twentieth century was particularly difficult for the Portuguese people.  Economic 
strife was the rule in the First Republic and, although Salazar must be credited for bringing 
stability to the nation in his early years of governance, the country was purposely kept more or 
less isolated from the rest of the world, with the almost certain result of profound socio-economic 
underdevelopment in the post WWII era. At the time of the Revolution , the Portuguese economy 
looked and operated more like that of a second or third world nation, still heavily dependent on 
agriculture with significant mal-distribution of wealth. Income distribution during the 1970s was 
somewhere between that in Western Europe and Latin American countries (Muller and Seligson 
1994).Their GDP per capita was certainly the lowest in Western Europe (The Economist 2001) 
   
The Economy and Society 
In the early 20th century, the population of approximately 5.5 million in Continental 
Portugal was dependent on a poor and undeveloped agricultural society, with 80% of the 
population living in rural areas (Machado 1991) and a large percentage not having any schooling. 
In Lisbon alone, the rate of illiteracy ranged from 46% in 1920 to 31% in 1940.  In other districts 
this percentage reached more than 75% (Machado 1991). The life expectancy then was only about 
35 years. Only after the restoration of democracy did the agricultural sector lose its primary place,  
going from 56% of the labor force in the 1930s to 34% in 1970 and finally 12% in the 1990s 
(Barreto 1996).  Given this situation,  the Estado Novo had plenty of fertile soil to grow in power 
and strength.   
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World War II represented a significant turning point in Portuguese life in society, with 
important consequences. Portugal had not had a positive balance of the commercial trade between 
World War I and 1941.  The trade of wolfram, useful for making armor shells, during the WWII 
proved to be good for business.  When the War ended, Portugal was on good terms with the 
Allies, enough so to warrant a founding place in establishment of  NATO (Oliveira 1995).   
Adherence to EFTA in the post-War era represented an important step towards the 
opening of the Portuguese economy.  It was not until the 1950s that Portugal saw some 
improvement in the social and economic conditions: GDP per capita doubled before the decade 
was over although this did not represent much.   
At the time of the Revolution in 1974, Portugal was clearly among the poorest of the 
Western European countries. The inherent political instability in the two years immediately after 
the Revolution led to a considerable underutilization and loss of economic resources and 
productive factors that in turn led to the first intervention of the IMF in 1978 and again in 1983. 
Even after the regular functioning of democratic institutions were secured, political instability 
plagued the young democracy. Two important events proved to be largely responsible for 
economic stability and progress in the latter half of the 1980s: 1) entry into the European Union 
after eight years of  negotiations; and 2) governing stability in the latter half of the 80s (Gallagher 
1988). Today a noticeable improvement in the quality of life in Portugal and approximation to the 
advanced industrial nations is undeniable. 
This general upward socioeconomic trend was accompanied by an increasing role of 
women in the social and economic life.  For instance, the percentage of women in the labour force 
increased dramatically, from about 18.2% of the total population in 1960 to 43.6% in 1997 
(Barreto 1996).  Women also became active in the political arena. In the national legislative body 
the percentage of female deputies was 6.8% in 1980, 13% in 1997, and 19.6% in 2000 
(Interparliamentary Union Report 1995). Today, the percentage of women in the national 
government is approximately 12%; it is also 12% in the Autonomous Regional Governments; and 
14% in the local governments .  As for the percentage of female members of the four major 
parties, it ranges from 19 to 25% (European Data Base www.db-decision.de/factsheets).  
 Illiteracy was halved, going from 34% of the total population in 1970 to 15% in 1991. 
The percentage of the population over 65 years of age doubled, going from 7.9% of the total 
population in 1960 to 16% in 1997. University degrees increased going from 1.5% of the total 
population of the in 1970 to 4.9% in 1991 (Barreto 1996).  
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Social Cleavages  
With respect to cleavages, Portugal is still among the most homogenous of the European 
nations It has no language divide; virtually every speaks Portuguese. There is no religious divide;  
most everyone is Roman Catholic. And although with every passing year there are more legal and 
illegal immigrants from the former African colonies, ethnicity and race are still not issues. The 
cleavages that do exist appear to be regional and ideological in nature. There are essentially three 
that deserve mention: 1) Church/Anti-clergy; 2) North/South regional cleavage; and finally 3) 
urban/rural cleavage.  
The cleavage between the Church and the anticlerical beliefs of the Portuguese 
Communist Party, the oldest of the parties we know today, dates back to the early 20s (Cunha 
1997). The Portuguese are approximately 97% Roman Catholic.  This party was most strongly 
established in rural provinces of the Alentejo,  south of Tagus river. This region is known as the 
Celeiro (or Silo) of Portugal because this was where the largest landowners had their properties in 
early 20th century. Even today, this southern part of the country is mostly left-leaning in partisan 
preference. Northern Portugal, as well as the Islands, being divided into smaller land lots and 
more traditionalist and Catholic managed to be Salazar´s largest support group in the early years. 
Salazar used this regional cleavage to his advantage and it is still reflected in today´s society and 
ideological support of political parties. This is especially notable when questions of moral nature 
arise. The results of the 1998 referendum on abortion is a good example (see Mendes 2000). 
Although the results were not binding, for reasons we shall speculate about later in the paper, they 
were revealing in two related respects: the North/South and Church/Communist party cleavages. 
The most devoutly Catholic northern region clearly voted in favour of the preservation of life and 
against the proposed extension of the period during which women could terminate their 
pregnancies under strict conditions of legality—75%—whereas the southern regions, noted for 
their anticlerical and Communist leanings voted pro-choice and safer settings for abortions, thus 
they voted in favour of the bill—73%.   
One last dichotomy is,  as is the North/South cleavage, geographic: the urban/rural 
divide.  Throughout its history as a fishing and navigating country, the urban areas were always 
on or close to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean coasts.  Social and economic development 
progressed faster in every respect in these areas with professionals, students, and business persons 
wanting to migrate to the coast and away from the more mountainous and rural interior towns. 
From 1960 to 1997 alone, the percentage of the population living in urban areas went from 22 to 
36.5%. This is reflected in the distribution of party support. Urban areas  have been known to 
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support the larger, more Centrist parties, the PSD and the PS, while the more rural areas have 
been more supportive of the more extremist parties.   
 
The Development of the Portuguese Electoral and Party System  
The contours of the Portuguese political system as we know it today are largely a result 
of the system the First Republic set in place and that the Estado Novo largely erased. The 
democratic beginnings in the early 20th century already shown its preference for proportional 
representation and party competition for power-holding positions in the parliament through direct 
but universal suffrage. 
 
The Electoral System 
Three constitutions shaped the existing electoral system in Portugal.  The Constitution of 
1911 defined the electoral system of the First Republic. It implanted a system of proportional 
representation with “incomplete lists” and established the supremacy of the parliament or 
legislative body in the political system (Oliveira 1995). This Constitution set up a bicameral 
parliamentary system with a deputy chamber and a senate that had the responsibility of electing 
the President of the Republic, who represented the nation but had no major powers. Only literate 
men, heads of family, and taxpayers were granted the right to vote.  These men amounted to 
about 10% of the entire population. 
Electoral rules of a serious democratic character became extinct during the next 50 years 
of the Estado Novo established in the Constitution of 1933.  Elections were held at the 
convenience of the government, or in other words, Salazar. Presidential elections, although direct, 
assumed the form of plebiscite up until the 1958 election. This election demonstrated the risk to 
the regime of granting an opportunity for he people to have a say.  
The Constitution of 1976 (revised four times between then and 2001) is the present law of 
the land, re-established a system of proportional representation and set in place a semi-
presidential system. In Democracia, all citizens 18 years of age or older were granted the right to 
vote, including for the first  time women. Article 149 of the present Constitution established 
mandatory and permanent  registration but this requirement has been flexibly interpreted to mean 
that both registration and the act of voting itself are civic rights more than duties, and therefore 
not automatic and obligatory. 
This Constitution names the Assembly of the Republic as one of four organs with 
supreme authority, along with the President, the Government, and the Courts (4th revision, 1997, 
Article 110). It is the supreme legislative organ representative of all Portuguese citizens (Article 
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147), although the Government and the Autonomous Regions´ Legislative Assemblies have 
limited legislating capacity. In addition to having the power to enact legislation and the 
prerogative to delegate legislative power to the Government and the Regional Legislative 
Assemblies, the Constitution enables the national Assembly with substantial other powers 
(Articles 162-3), such as the approval of the formation of Government (Article 187),  the review 
of the Government by approving or not its major economic and political plans, including its 
budget, passing motions of censure, and questioning and suspending members of the Government 
and the civil service. Other powers include amending the Constitution, approving international 
conventions, and selecting a given number of members to the Constitutional Court, the Council of 
the State, and the Supreme Council of the Judiciary. 
 Two hundred and thirty deputies are elected to the Assembly (Article 148º). Four are 
allocated to the votes of the citizens living abroad; the remaining 226 come from 20 electoral 
districts by way of closed lists of rank-ordered candidates according to the electoral formula of 
d´Hondt.  Eighteen districts are located on the mainland, and one belongs to each of the Atlantic 
Island formations, Madeira and the Açores.  
The President wields substantial power within the norms of a parliamentary system.  
Among other things, he or she is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, holds conditional 
power to appoint the Prime Minister and other ministers, can within certain limits remove the 
Prime Minister and the Government, and has limited positive and negative veto powers over 
legislation.1  In order for a person to become President, he or she must be 35 years of age and 
may not have served two consecutive terms as president nor resigned the presidency within the 
preceding five years.2  With those provisos, the President is popularly elected by absolute 
majority rule, with a two-candidate runoff election should no candidate´s votes exceed the 
majority of the valid votes in the initial election, to a five-year term on a date that cannot coincide 
                                                     
1 The limited negative veto is what one typically sees in the hands of a chief executive.  The Portuguese 
President can negate a decree passed by the Assembly or Government with a public declaration of reasons 
for doing so (Article 136).  The President’s veto power is limited in the sense that the Assembly can 
override the veto with an absolute majority of votes provided two-thirds of the members are present when 
that override vote is taken.  Another power of negation belongs to the President in conjunction with the 
Constitutional Court.  Upon receiving a decree from the Assembly or Government, the President can ask 
the Court for an anticipatory review of the constitutionality of the decree’s provisions.  Failure of the decree 
to pass constitutional muster negates it.  The positive veto is somewhat of an anomaly.  Article 283 of the 
Constitution allows the President to ask the Constitutional Court to decide whether failure to enact 
legislation on a matter necessary to implement constitutional provisions contravenes the Constitution.  
When the Court finds the omission is a contravention of the Constitution, it is instructed to report that 
finding to the competent legislative organ.  
2 Under the provisions of the original constitution, the President was required to be a member of the armed 
forces.  This requirement was dropped when the Constitution was revised in 1982.  This was also the 
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with Assembly elections (Articles 121-26). He or she represents the entire Republic and holds 
responsibility for the independence and unity of the state (Article 120).   
 
The Party System in the Electorate and Parliament 
The Portuguese party system as we know it today developed in the First Republic. Three 
parties existed at the time: the Republicanos, the Independentes, and the Socialistas (see Table 1). 
Political issues were first and foremost about the candidates and personalities and not the policies.   
The party system was fragmented; different prominent personalities gave rise to several factions 
with the  PRP which resulted in the division of the PRP into four distinct parties: the Partido 
Evolucionista; the União Republica; the Independents; and the PRP itself. Factions came and 
went, with the result that a total of nineteen parties were represented in the Assembly at one point 
or another.  Elections were frequent, on average every two or three years.  
[Table 1 about here] 
With the Estado Novo came the end of the party proliferation and of democratic partes as 
we know them. The União Nacional was the only legal political organisation, but the dictatorship 
was unable to vanquish all opposing political forces. The most impressive example of this is 
Partido Comunista (Portuguese Communist Party), founded in 1921. It was able to survive under 
political repression regime.   Since the 1940s the party was led by Álvaro Cunhal.   
Another political force of the Estado Novo was the MDP/CDE (Portuguese Democratic 
Movement), founded in 1969 in time to run in the elections for the National Assembly.  Although 
it represented a significant influence in the Estado Novo, the party is  now a minor party almost 
always functions as a kind of satellite of the PCP.  
The PCTP/MRPP (Portuguese Workers Communist Party/ Revolutionary Movement of 
the Proletarian Party) emerged in 1970. This was another significant political organisation that 
was a large inspiration behind students´ movements in the 70s. Like the MDP/CDE, it turned out 
to be a minor party never being able to win a seat in Parliament.   
The PS (Socialist Party) was founded in 1973 in Bad Muenstereiffel, West Germany, by a 
group of socialist oppositionists that were exhiled at that time (Sablosky 1997).  Among these 
leaders was Mário Soares who created the Portuguese branch and served as its leader until 1985. 
Contrary to the previous three parties, the PSP was born of democracy and, eager to hold 
democratic power situated  itself in the Centre-Left.   
                                                                                                                                                              
revision that reduced the power of the controversial Council of the Revolution, which until then supervised 
the work of all organs of government. 
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All other parties were created after the dictatorship was replaced. Here, we will focus on 
the two most relevant parties of the democratic regime, the PSD and the CDS at the Centre-Right 
of the political spectrum respectively (see Figure 1). The PPD (People’s Democratic Party), later 
called the PSD (Social Democratic Party), appeared in May of 1974. Its three founding fathers 
were previously members of the liberal wing of the pre-Revolution National Assembly (Frain 
1997). The CDS (Social Democratic Centre), later called PP (Popular Party) was created in July 
of 1974 and is often thought of and described as the most Right-leaning of the conservative 
parties represented in the Assembly (Frain 1997).   
[Figure 1 about here] 
Basically, these four parties—the PS, PSD, PCP, and the PP—are the key players in the 
Portuguese system since 1974. Following the coup these parties struggled through November of 
1975 to decide how to mould the new regime. Nation-building decisions sparked heated debates 
that went down in history as the Verão Quente de 1975 (Hot Summer of 1975). The PS, PSD, and 
CDS struggled to secure a more Western-like representative democracy against the intent of the 
PCP and the Leftist branches of the military forces that preferred an even more Leftist flavor to 
the democratic regime, similar to the orthodox Communist model or a military regime similar to 
those of third world countries (Bruneau and Macleod 1986: 3). A compromise was eventually 
reached with the PS, PSD, and the CDS/PP setting down most of their ideas in what was and still 
is, at least theoretically speaking,  a Leftist-sounding manifesto, the Constitution of 1976.   
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The Electorate: Party Identification and Voter Turnout 
 
Two aspects characterize an electorate politically: their attachment or  identification with 
the parties and their voting behaviour. Table 2  reports the aggregated results of the Portuguese 
political attachment and their self-placement along the political spectrum. Typically, the 
Portuguese have viewed themselves as being in the Centre of the political spectrum. In the last 10 
years, they have given large vote percentages to the PS or the PSD. Table 3 crosstabulates the 
electorate´s Left-Right self-placement results with the voters´ past vote; these crosstabulates show 
that the majority of those placing themselves in the Centre of the political spectrum voted for the 
PS and the PSD.  
[Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
 With such overwhelming numbers, one might guess that the Portuguese are strongly 
identify themselves with the parties closest to the Centre. However, that is not the case. 
Surprisingly, the party identification is not high. During Portugal´s twenty five years of 
Democracia, the Portuguese electorate has not grown close to the political parties. The 
EuroBarometer surveys reveal that the Portuguese  are quite far from identifying themselves with 
a particular party.  Every time the Portuguese were asked to what extent they felt close to any 
party,  an overwhelming majority—more than three-fourths—stated that it merely sympathisised 
with a party or was not at all close to one.  The Portuguese electorate is not very different from 
the electorates of other EU member states. In general across these same years, the mean has 
consistently lied in vicinity of 3.0, meaning “merely sympathising with a party”. 
Party attachment is not the only political aspect of the Portuguese electorate considered 
on the low side. The Portuguese have been identified among the Europeans that least to turnout to 
vote. In the last legislative election, Portugal indeed had the recorded lowest turnout in the 
legislative elections—61%—compared to the EU average, 76%. It is true that the number of 
voters has dwindled throughout its 20 districts since the first free election in 1975. However, a 
look past the raw turnout percentages is worth considering. These latter numbers conceal a 
phenomenon that may be at the root of the decreasing voter turnout, more so than voting 
behaviour itself.   
Throughout a quarter of a century of democratic rule, voter turnout in legislative elections 
has gone from a figure in the vicinity of  90 to approximately 60% and even less in most districts.  
An examination of  Table 4 and Figure 2 clearly shows that turnout did indeed decline steadily in 
every district.  For example, consider the turnout rates in Lisboa, Porto, and  Braga—the three 
largest districts. Turnout in these districts was respectively: 91.9%, 93.8%, and 93.0% in 1975,  
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77.6, 78.7%, and 78.8% in 1985,  67.1%, 71.0%, and 71.1% in 1995, and most recently in 1999, 
61.8%, 65.0%, and 67.4%.   
[Table 4 and Figure 2 about here] 
Given its ratio composition, voter turnout can decline in three ways. One way may be a 
decrease in the number of voters; another may be an increase in the number of persons eligible to 
vote; or both.  In the Portuguese case, the districts have indeed experienced a decrease in the 
number of voters. In fact, from 1975 through 1999, the average change in the number of voters 
across elections years in each district varied approximately from –.002 to .03, for an average 
change across election years of -.01 across all districts.  However, the number of persons 
registered to vote also increased during this time period. While the number of voters declined 
slightly, the number of names on the electoral rolls grew dramatically—and at a higher rate. This 
occurred in very nearly every election year. One exception consistent across all districts is the 
1979 election, an especially contested election year in Portuguese democratic history. The 
average change in the number of those registered is +.03.  That is higher than the average growth 
in the population itself and in the segment of the population aged 15 through 19 from one election 
year to the next. To check this, let us take,  for example,  the 1991 population, registration, and 
elections results.  Table 5 shows a comparison of these figures. A quick look at this Table clearly 
reveals that something is suspect about the electoral rolls: the difference between the 1991 Census 
estimates of the population and the number of persons registered to vote is noticeably smaller 
than the segment of the population that is not even old enough to be eligible to register.3  
[Table 5 about here] 
This suggests that the electoral rolls must be inflated. If the electoral rolls were not 
inflated, this difference should be quite close to the census estimates of those who should not yet 
be eligible to register. Obviously, there can be and most likely are individuals over 18 who have 
not yet registered ,4 but this only means that the difference between the population and the 
number of those registered should be even larger than the segment of the population under age.  
Column F of Table 5 shows that in 1991, the rolls in every district were inflated from 12% in 
Porto and Aveiro to 30% in Vila Real, 33% in Bragança, and a maximum of 64% in Braga.  
                                                     
3 Eighteen the minimum age to register, therefore it would be preferred to have data on the segment of the 
population aged 18 and younger. However, available statistical data used 19 as the breakoff age. This 
should not prove damaging to the point we are making concerning the difference between what the 
electoral rolls suggest should be the population underage to register and the actual number of those 
ineligible to register given such a large difference.  The number of individuals aged 19 should not decrease 
the difference by very much.   
4 The Constitution states that electoral registration is compulsory but in practice that is not what occurs. It is 
up to each individual to take the necessary steps to register. 
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How is it possible that there are more persons registered than the number of the 
individuals who are over eligible to register? It is not theoretically logical for number of 
registered persons registered to grow at the same rate as the actual growth in the population—
much less a higher rate. But in fact that is what is appears to have happened. The population grew 
at a rate of .02, and  the number of persons eligible to vote, that is the number of registered 
persons, grew at almost twice that rate, .01. Figure 3 illustrates this quite well. The population as 
well as the number of voters in each election year grew ever so slightly. But the number of 
persons registered to vote grew at a rapid rate from 1975 to the present. One reason for this 
inconsistent phenomenon is that the electoral rolls may be inflated with names of deceased 
persons.  Another reason may be perhaps that the names of those who have moved from one 
municipality to another have consistently been kept on the rolls in the previous residential 
municipality so that they become registered in both locales. Either situation is possible given that 
there has been little control on matters of electoral registration by political authorities. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
According to the Portuguese constitutional and electoral law,  the apportionment of seats 
per district is based on the number of registered voters in the district (Article 149), after 
allowance for four seats elected by Portuguese citizens living abroad, thus providing 
municipalities with an incentive for not removing names from the rolls and thus restricting 
turnout figures.  Let us consider that the fact that in 1998, the government proceeded for the first 
time ever to update the electoral rolls. The number of registered persons in the 1999 in the most 
recent legislative election actually decreased on average -.01 in 14 out of 20 districts. In the eight 
districts that continued to register an increase in the number of registered persons 1999, it was the 
lowest increase ever. 
 
The Parties: Number and Competitive Strategies 
As the numbers on party identification alluded to, the electoral competition for 
governmental power in Portugal has focused almost exclusively on the Left-leaning PS and the 
Right-leaning PSD over the last 10 years.  The election results in Table 6 show that in the last 
three legislative elections, 1991, 1995, and 1999 the combined vote of the PS and PSD totaled 
approximately 80%.  From 1975 through 1987, these two parties won as little as 52 and never 
more than 76%.  Even then, their highest combined vote percentages came when the PS was in an 
electoral alliance with two smaller parties (UEDS and ASDI, in 1980) and when the PSD was 
aligned electorally with CDS, PPM, and Reformists (the AD alliance in 1979 and 1980).  Up until 
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1987, the Communists were receiving between 12 and 20% of the vote while the CDS/PP and 
other small parties to the Right of the PSD were receiving between 10 and 17% of the vote. 
These vote percentages tell a common tale of partisan competition during a nation’s first 
generation of democratic governance.  The first 12 years of the Democracia exhibit a pattern of 
variable party competition similar to that seen in other emerging democratic systems and, for that 
matter, in re-established regimes throughout Europe after World War II (Taagepera and Shugart 
1989, 87-88).  New and revamped systems tend to experience an early period of erratic, uncertain 
competition as ambitious politicians experiment to see what strategies will work.  With 
experience as a teacher, the more as well as less successful politicians and organisations 
reconsider and re-strategize.  The result, often, is to bring clarity to the nature of the competition.  
That is, through the early years of the process one learns who is vying for governmental power, 
who might be a pivot party for government formation, and who is positioning to keep their policy 
or ideological voice heard.  Thereafter, electoral competition settles into a relatively more 
predictable pattern. 
The right hand column of Table 6 records the effective number of Portuguese parties, 
according to both their votes and seats.5  From 1975 to 1987, the Portuguese party system had, 
effectively, from three to five electoral parties and from two-and-a-half to four parliamentary 
parties.  Since 1987, the Portuguese party system has been effectively a three-party system in the 
electorate and a two-and-a-half party system in the legislature. 
[Table 6 about here] 
By standards set by mechanical effects of electoral rules, Portugal’s party system at the 
end of Democracia’s first generation has to be considered small. With an assembly size of 230, 
20 districts, no legal threshold, and a within-district-only d’Hondt allocation rule, Portugal’s 
effective district magnitude is 11.5—i.e., the average number of seats per electoral district as 
adjusted for compensatory/additional seat allocations and for legal thresholds of inclusion (see 
Lijphart 1994, 25-9).  Alone, that sort of effective district magnitude produces an expected 3.8 
effective parties, something on the order of what one might find in Norway or Sweden 
                                                     
5 Political scientists have come to rely on the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index, originally 
developed in economics to describe concentrations in foreign trade (Hirschman 1945), to describe the 
effective number of parties in a system (see Laakso and Taagepera 1979).  The formula weights the system-
wide vote or seat proportions received by the parties to describe the system at large.  In a formula, the 
effective number of parties (Neff) is: 
(Neff)  =  1 / Σ pi2 , 
where pi
2 is the proportion of votes (to produce NVeff) or seats  (to produce NSeff), received by party i, and 
the squared proportion is summed across all parties receiving votes or seats.  
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(Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 135-41).6  But that is not what in fact occurs. During the 1990s, the 
two-and-a-half to three party system makes Portugal´s party system look similar to either 
Ireland´s party system, with its small district magnitudes and with its single-transferable vote rule 
(STV), or Germany´s system, with its high legal threshold and two-tier compensatory allocation.   
Three pressures operate to hold down the effective number of Portuguese parties.  One is 
Portugal’s semi-presidential system.  Another is a relatively small number of issue dimensions 
that crosscut the Portuguese society.  The third is a rather remarkably high breakeven point in the 
proportionate translation of vote to seat percentages, which is a consequence of an electoral bias 
favouring large parties, the PSD in particular, when votes are translated into seats. 
 
Presidentialism.  The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic awards the President substantial 
power within the norms of a parliamentary system, as we have discussed.    According to 
Matthew Shugart and John Carey (Shugart and Carey 1992; see also, Lijphart 1994, 130-4), such 
a powerfully endowed and popularly elected individual will tend to focus the electoral energies of 
parties and thereby exert pressure to  reduce the number of effective parties. 
 The Constitution states that the President represents the entire Republic and holds 
responsibility for the independence and unity of the state (Article 120).  Under that mandate, the 
Constitution does not anticipate that presidential candidates will be advocates for partisan policy 
positions.  Indeed, presidential nominations come through petitions signed by a requisite number 
of citizens and submitted to the Constitutional Court (Article 124).  With substantial power at 
stake and with one of the well-served functions of political parties being the organisation of an 
electorate, the Portuguese parties have found a way find a way into the presidential electoral 
process.  Typically, persons announce their intentions to be presidential candidates; thereafter the 
parties meet formally and express their preference or support for one of the announced 
candidates.   
The results of Portugal’s six presidential elections are reported in Table 7.  Overall, there 
is a tendency of parties to coalesce in one of two patterns that, in the end, has led to the election 
of a Left/Centre-leaning President. At times a Centre coalition of the PS and PSD formed—1976 
and 1981.  At other times, Left-leaning versus Right-leaning coalitions have formed—1980, the 
1986 runoff, and 1996.  One clear consequence is that the candidate supported  by the Socialists 
has won all six elections.  Another consequence is that presidential elections do appear to exert 
                                                     
6 Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 144) suggest that an approximate description for translating effective 
district magnitude into an effective number of electoral parties (NVeff) is:  
(NVeff) =  1.25 (2 +  log 10Meff). 
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pressure to a reduced number of parties.  Except for 1986, the effective number of parties is in the 
vicinity of 2.0.  Interestingly, the 1986 election provides a particularly good illustration of 
pressure toward a small effective party system but also provides a strong qualification to the 
tendency. 
[Table 7 about here] 
In the 1985, supporters of President Eanes launched a new party, the PRD, which staked 
out a position between the PS and the PCP.  The infighting among Socialists had its roots in 
disputes between Eanes and Soares that could be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s.  With 
Eanes constitutionally unable to succeed himself, having served two presidential terms, his 
supporters laid the foundation for a new party in the preceding 1985 Assembly elections.  They 
argued that the PS had lost its compass on the path toward a democratic socialist society.  The 
PRD proved a serious detriment to the electoral appeal of the PS for Assembly seats.  It won over 
18% of the vote and nearly the same percentage of seats; the PS received its lowest vote 
percentage, 21.4, during the Democracia period.  During the following presidential election, the 
PRD and Eanes himself supported Francisco Salgado Zenha, a founding member of the renewed-
PS shortly after the Revolution, who had sided with President Eanes when he took issue with 
Soares during the late-70’s and early-80s.  The presidential result was a three-way split of the 
vote on the left among Soares (PS, 25.4%), Zenha (PRD and PCP, 20.9%), and Lourdes 
Pintasilgo (UDP, 7.4%)—see Table 7.  Soares finished second, ahead of Zenha; and while he was 
a distant second, it was enough to get him into a runoff with Freitas do Amaral.  Seen in the light 
focused on events leading to Eanes successor, it appears that an ideological dispute resulting  
from  personalities of the candidates seeking power through the presidential office could come 
together to fractionalise the parties. 
The pressure for electoral coalitions was clearly evident during the presidential runoff.  
Freitas do Amaral, a former student of Marcelo Caetano´s pre-Revolution government and a 
founder of the decidedly Right-of-Centre, CDS/PP, had finished first in the first-round election.  
To some observers he appeared to be a shoe-in in the runoff.  During the three weeks between the 
elections, however, the PRD, PCP, and UDP stood behind Soares.  When the PCP convened in an 
extraordinary session in early February, the party secretary, Álvaro Cunhal, said: “If it upsets you 
to vote for him [Soares, former PS leader], shut your eyes.  Ignore the name and photo.  Just put a 
cross in the box next to them on the ballot paper” (quoted in Keesing’s 1986, 34313).  With the 
PRD, PCP and UDP support, Soares eked out a victory.  The seemingly ideological dogmatism 
on the Left appears to have had its limits. 
                                                                                                                                                              
For an effective district magnitude of 11.5, the expected value of Nv is 3.83. 
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The presidential results suggest that the electoral basis of this office does indeed have a 
constricting on the party system, with a focus on the Centre.  They also offer evidence of a 
caution not to overstate that tendency.  The presidential office could prove fertile ground for 
launching a new party given the appropriate candidate with who can claim to be filling an 
ideological void.  Still, typically, there are in the neighborhood of just over two effective parties 
at the presidential level.  Viewed in conjunction with the legislative election results reported 
above, Table 6, one has the impression of a “stretched” two-party system.  The major parties are 
in the Centre, one leaning a little to the Left and the other to the Right, and each of the major 
parties has its extremist on its wings.  The wings stand on their own principles to the  extent that 
prudence permits.  At those times when electoral success and, with it, the pursuit of governing 
power require, the system temporarily constitutes effectively two umbrella parties.  
 
Issue Cleavages.  A second restricting influence on the number of effective parties is that of issue 
cleavages. The few salient issue cleavages that exist among the Portuguese people and parties do 
not create much need nor leave much room for the development of a large number of parties.  
This, too, can be expected to reduce the number of parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 
1984; 1999; Taagepera and Grofman 1985).  
In the early 90s at the request of Michael Laver and Ben Hunt,  a few experts weighed in 
and pronounced themselves on the issue positions of the parties in 16 Western democracies, 
among them the Portuguese parties (Laver and Hunt 1992). From the expert assessments, Laver 
and Hunt were among the first to provide the results of a survey of expert opinions on where the 
parties stand on eight particular issues and how important these issues are to the them. 
Table 8 reports the Laver-Hunt  recorded  salience of the four major Portuguese parties 
on these eight issues (see, Laver and Hunt 1992, 286-91). The most salient issue for all major 
parties is public ownership of the means of production, which Laver and Hunt report to be the 
most indicative of the Left-Right dimension. Companion to Table 8 is Figure 4, showing that to 
whatever extent other issues are salient, the Laver-Hunt experts see the major Portuguese parties 
as holding different pro-con positions but lining up in essentially the same Left-Right order from 
one issue area to the next.  Looking at the party positions assigned by the experts, one’s first 
impression is that there is a general Left-Right dimension, covering economic and social issues, 
and a second centralisation/decentralisation dimension. There is a seeming distinctiveness of a 
second dimension due to the outlying position of the PCP on the issue of centralisation and 
decentralisation. Indeed, Laver and Hunt (1992, 53) themselves speak of a singular dimension on 
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which all of the issues, except for centralization/decentralization, load heavily.  
Centralisation/decentralisation is the only issue loading on a second dimension. 
[Table 8 and Figure 4 about here] 
Although there appears to be a second dimension, it must be interpreted with caution. 
This is because centralisation/decentralisation is much more a matter of the means of organizing 
political advocacy within the Portuguese context than a goal in and of itself.  In advanced 
industrial societies, the Left tends to advocate centralized decision-making and improving the 
quality of life in the environment and of the workers congregating in cities. However, 
centralisation in the Portuguese mindset has instrumental value; it is not an ideological goal.  
Centralisation makes it easier to organize a planned economy and minimize the risk that localized 
political jurisdictions will variously define and distribute public sector goods and services with 
the effect that the scope of public goods is more narrow than it would be were they defined by 
one decisionmaker for an entire nation (Schattschneider 1960). In Portugal, with its experience of 
dictatorial rule and totally centralized government, a sizable agricultural sector, and a huge 
maldistribution of landholdings in rural areas, the political Left sees the instrumental value of 
centralisation differently.  On the far-Left, the groupings of identified Communist factions, 
including the Greens (PEV), are divided on the question of centralisation (Laver and Hunt 1992, 
289).   Near the Left-Centre of the spectrum, the PS has mixed motives.  Centralisation helps the 
PS desires to pursue a planned economy. But to avoid the risk of totalitarian rule, the PS favours 
distributing decision-making.  As Silvia Mendes (2000) explains, when the decentralisation 
question took centre-stage in the form of a 1998 referendum asking whether there should be 
devolution of political authority to regional units, it was not easy to discern where the Socialists 
stood.  This was despite the PS’s seemingly commitment to devolution as foreshadowed by the 
1976 Constitution.  In 1998, no party seems to have articulated a commanding and appealing 
principle for or against devolution.  The debate seems to have been gone in the direction of 
technical and ancillary matters—e.g., the public finance expense of decentralisation, what it 
meant to Portugal’s position in the EU, and the predictability how it might rearrange political 
competition.  
By overlaying a single line across the party positions (i.e., dimensional line drawn at 
about a 45° angle, that Laver and Hunt refer to as the underlying Left-Right dimension), we see  
that there is only one dimension (see Figure 4). 
Given the single-dimension of Portuguese politics, as seen through the lens of experts 
viewing the major parties, across the board, issue by issue, the PCP is furthest Left and the PP is 
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furthest Right.7  In between, the PS is located at a Centre-Left position and the PSD at a Centre-
Right position in conformity with Figure 1, previously introduced.  The consequence is that the 
issue space as organised by the Portuguese major parties appears to form one dimension.  
Whether the issue involves the ownership of the means of production, taxation and service 
allocations by the state, foreign relations, state control over social and religious aspects of life, or 
others, we find the parties arrange themselves along a one-dimensional policy space. At least 
according to these experts they are. 
 
Disproportionality.  It might be said, half in jest and half-seriously, that political parties provide 
an answer to the question of whether falling trees make a sound in the forest when no one is 
around.  Parties and their would-be vote supporters ask whether policy advocacy has any meaning 
if none or few of its candidates find their way to parliament.  For this reason, even if policy is its 
foremost concern, a party that is continually disadvantaged by the rules translating votes into 
seats faces an uphill battle to keep its voters in subsequent elections and to serve the office-
holding ambitions of its politically active members.  In turn, it follows, disproportionately high 
seat returns for large parties and, concomitantly, disproportionately low seat returns for small 
parties encourage the party system to contract in number.  Such is the case in Portugal. 
 A review of the numbers in Table 6 shows that anytime a party received more than 20% 
of the vote—and this occurred with the PS and PSD or their alliances—the party received a seat-
versus-vote bonus.  Taking a party’s seat percentage and subtracting from the party’s vote 
percentage shows that Portuguese parties with small to moderate vote shares have suffered seat-
versus-vote deficits between –0.1 and –2.8. The PSD and PS, on the other hand, have received 
seat-versus-vote bonuses between 1 and 8 percent. 
Figure 5 illustrates how the advantages and disadvantages correspond to the variability in 
the vote levels.  The figure helps to illustrate two forms of electoral advantage.  First, it marks the 
breakeven point for votes and seats somewhere near the vicinity of 20% of the vote.  Parties 
winning votes above the 20% mark receive a seat bonus; those below that mark suffer a seat 
deficit.  Relatively speaking, this is a very high breakeven point for a PR system.  A breakeven 
score of 20 is below that of Anglo-American single-member district plurality systems (31 to 
47%), but compared to other Western European PR systems during the 20th century, only the 
                                                     
7 A convenient way to gain a visual image of the single dimension is to have the mind’s eye draw a line 
from any party issue position to the illustrated dimension so that the imaginary line comes to the illustrated 
dimension at a 90° angle.  We have drawn one such imaginary line from the PCP’s position on 
decentralisation.  It should be obvious that, for example, all the PCP issue positions are furthest Left along 
the illustrated dimension. 
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French system in 1945-46 had a breakeven point as high as 20 (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 90-
1).  Almost surely this puts pressure on small and medium-sized parties to coalesce as well as on 
voters to focus their attention on the two largest parties.  The second electoral advantage only  
involves the two major parties.  There is a general tendency for the PSD large-party seat bonus to 
exceed the seat bonus going to the PS.  On average, across all the 10 elections, the PSD seat 
bonus is +4.4 while the PS seat bonus is +2.8.  We believe this has something to do with the 
degree of the disproportionality because the higher the vote percentage, the larger the seat bonus 
more so for the PS as shown in the slope comparison.  The PSD average vote is 37.7% compared 
to the PS average of 33.5%.  However, as shown in Figure 4, even after taking the vote 
percentage differences into account, by overlaying a least squares line on seat advantages in 
relationship to the vote percentages, there is a general tendency for the PSD to receive a larger 
seat bonus than the PS—this is a bias in favour of the PSD. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 In addition to what the disproportionality of the system suggests about the pressures that 
reduce the effective number of parties, it raises a question about the operation of the electoral 
rules.  How could a seemingly reasonable and fair set of rules—an assembly of 230 members, 
elected under d’Hondt rules in 20 districts with no legal threshold—be associated with such a 
high breakeven point and with a general tendency to reward the PSD more so than the PS?  The 
answer, we think, could come from biases in the system. 
 
Electoral Bias.  Two types of electoral bias can arise under most electoral systems.  One is the 
result of the way a system creates differential voter weights  due to either malapportionment in 
seat allocations or to differential turnout rates.  The other comes from the electoral formula used 
to allocate seats on the basis of votes within districts. In Portugal, this formula is the d’Hondt 
rule.   
 Rotten boroughs and rules favouring rural over urban areas are legendary in SMD 
systems, as in the UK during the 19th century and U.S. into the 1960s, but malapportionment 
systems can exist in PR systems as well.  As a hypothetical example of malapportionment under 
PR rules in Portugal, imagine that the Lisboa district deserves, on the basis of its number of 
eligible voters, 60 seats, but that the apportionment allocates only 50 seats.  A party that receives 
its highest vote percentage in this district will win fewer seats than its nationwide percentage of 
the vote would require because the votes in this district are undervalued.  Votes would be 
weighted as 5/6ths of their fair value.  Malapportionment is a structural problem.  The same 
consequence can arise for behavioural reasons associated with turnout differentials across 
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districts.  On this score, imagine two fairly apportioned districts, each with 10 seats and 1000 
eligible voters.  In District #1, only 100 votes are cast with the parties’ votes distributed as A = 
70, B = 20, and C = 10.  In District #2, all the eligible voters cast a ballot, and the party votes are 
A = 300, B = 500, and C = 200.  Under a fair allocation, by district, party A will win 50% of the 
seats (seven from District #1 and three from District #2) with only 33.6% of the vote (370/1100). 
The 226 seats for resident citizens are apportioned to the 20 electoral districts, 18 
contiguous geographical areas on the continent and one district each for the autonomous island 
regions of the Açores and Madeira.  The district boundaries are set by statute.  The voter 
registration on which the apportionment is based is compulsory and permanent (Article 113).  As 
suggested in our discussion of voter turnout, the registration system makes one wonder whether 
there may not be some form of political maneuvering for partisan gain when it comes to getting 
and keeping voters’ names on the rolls.  In turn, basing the apportionment of seats on registration 
makes one wonder whether electoral bias due to malapportionment may have crept into the 
system. 
Table 9 reports population and registered voters counts, as well as for  each of the each of 
the 20 electoral districts.  For the 1991 election, the time of the most recent available official 
census of population.  We can compare the third column of numbers, the actual seat 
apportionment, to two precisely calculated theoretical apportionment values.  The first 
comparison is to what a hypothetically precise apportionment based on population, rather than on 
registered voters, would yield.  Recognizing that any precise apportionment is impossible because 
seats are allocated in whole numbers while precise calculations include fractions, we see that only 
five of the 20 districts have actual apportionments that differ by more than rounding (i.e., + 0.5).  
These include the four of the five largest districts—Aveiro, Braga, Lisboa, and Porto—plus the 
Madeira islands district.  Aveiro, Braga, Porto, and Madeira are slightly undervalued; Lisboa is 
noticeably overvalued with seats 3.16 above what its population size alone would indicate.  The 
second comparison makes it clear that the slight under and overvaluing in certain districts, with 
respect to population size, is due in part to registration differentials.  Comparably speaking, 
Aveiro, Braga, and Porto are slightly undervalued because their populations are low relative to 
the individuals registered.  Indeed, in the case of Porto, the 1.4 seat undervaluing with respect to 
population becomes a 1.18 seat overvaluing when it comes to registered voters.  It appears that, 
by and large, using of registration as compared to population may take away from the larger 
districts is in the end restored by an apportionment formula that provides a slight advantage to 
large districts.  Notice that the two largest districts, Lisboa and Porto, each have seat allocation 
that is more than 0.5 above what the precise registration-based apportionment would yield.  On 
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the basis of these numbers, we must conclude that it is difficult to see how any sort of systematic 
malappotionment bias in favour of one party or the other exists in the Portuguese electoral 
system. 
[Table 9 about here] 
Could there be some form of interrelationship among apportionment, voter turnout, and 
the distribution of party votes that come together to favour the larger parties relative to the 
medium-sized and small parties and to benefit the PSD relative to the PS?  The evidence that 
responds to that question is a resounding no.  Students of SMD elections since the time of Francis 
Edgeworth’s initial foray into investigating electoral bias (Edgeworth 1898, 536) have shown that 
the total vote-weight bias, which combines biases due to malapportionment with those due to 
turnout, can be calculated by means of simple arithmetic (Butler 1947, pp. 284-85).  The 
nationwide vote percentage for a party is implicitly calculated with each voter given an equal 
weight.  The calculation of an average vote percentage for a party across a set of districts with 
weights set according to the number of seats, means that any difference between the nationwide 
percentage and the weighted average percentage records the difference between fair vote weights 
and vote weights that they are affected by malapportionment differentials, turnout differentials, or 
both.  These calculations for Portugal’s 1991 election show that the difference is never more than 
nine one-hundredths of one percent (0.09%).  By way of contrast, in the United States this 
calculation can be shown to have been as large as 3 and 4% (Campbell 1996).  In short, there is 
nothing in either the apportionment or the turnout rates across districts that would appear to 
produce a degree of partisan bias worth mentioning. 
Of course, the high breakeven point, the advantages for the larger parties in general, and 
the advantage to the PSD over the PS are still unaccounted for.  Given that it is not due to 
electoral biases associated with malapportionment or turnout, it almost certainly must be due to 
favouritism toward the large parties that arise from the seat allocation formula itself. 
The d’Hondt formula for allocating seats based on vote percentages has a well-known 
tendency to favour parties that win large vote percentages.  How much a large party is favoured 
depends on district magnitude so that the larger the magnitude, the smaller the favouritism.  As a 
general tendency, Portugal’s 11.5 effective district magnitude or 11.3 if we only consider the 226 
seats allocated from the residential vote (#of seats / #of districts) should produce seat allocations 
with reasonable proportionate accuracy, or so it would seem.  To say that Portugal’s district 
magnitude is 11.5 is to use an average value to describe the system overall.  As with so many 
descriptions based on an average value, there can be distortions in what the average actually tells 
us about reality.  Table 8 showed that the Portugal’s average district magnitude is a central 
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tendency based on a highly skewed distribution.  To see this,  let us consider the median district 
magnitude. While the average is 11.5, the median district magnitude is seven.  Only 10 out of 20 
districts win seats  ranging from three to six.  The other half have seats ranging from eight to 50 
seats, with two of these being outliers on the very high end, Lisboa with its 49 seats and Porto 
with 37.   
From the literature developed by Rokkan (1968) through Rae, Hanby, and Loosemore 
(1971) and Lijphart and Gibberd (1977), it can and has been shown that under the d’Hondt 
formula a party could win as much as 25% of the vote in a three-seat district and never actually 
win a single seat.  Generally, to be certain of winning a seat a party’s vote percentage must 
exceed (100 x [1 / M + 1]), where M is the district magnitude.  In three, four, five, and six seat 
districts, therefore, a party would have to exceed, respectively, 25, 20, 16.7, and 14.2 percent of 
the vote to guarantee itself one seat.  In Portugal, therefore, a small party can guarantee itself a 
seat from the Lisboa district with about 2% of the vote.  In half of the districts, the vote 
percentage must be much higher. In those districts with three to six seats, a party’s vote 
percentage will need to be higher than 25%, with three seats and higher than  14.2%, with six 
seats. 
In stricter terms, whether a party actually has to reach those vote levels to win a seat 
within a district depends on the vote distribution across all of the parties and not just a single 
party.  To see how allocations might work, we can take an example similar to what we might 
actually see in Portugal, with five parties, A-E in the table below, receiving vote percentages of 
39, 31, 12, 9, and 8.  The numbers in the left-hand column give the d’Hondt divisor, from 1 to 5, 
and the numbers to the right of the divisions (in bold) give the rank order priority for receiving a 
seat. 
Hypothetical Example of Party Vote Percentage in a Distict 
   (seat allocation priority number in bold next to the dividend) 
             Party          A                   B                     C                    D                    E 
  39%               31%                12%                9%                  8% 
     d’Hondt 
     Divisor 
          1   39.00   1        31.00   2        12.00   6          9.00    9          8.00   10 
          2   19.50   3        15.50   4          6.00   -           4.50    -           4.00    - 
          3   13.00   5        10.33   7          4.00   -           3.00    -           2.67    - 
          4     9.75   8          7.75   -           3.00   -           2.25    -           2.00    - 
          5     7.80   -           6.20   -           2.40   -           1.80    -           1.60    - 
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 Under the given vote percentages, the two largest parties win the first five seats.  Thus, in 
a district with three, four, or five seats, the two large parties win 100% of the seats with 70 
percent of the vote.  Even in an eight-seat district, the two largest parties win seven out of eight 
seats, i.e., 87.5% of the seats with 70% of the vote.  Notice, also, that generally but not always the 
single largest party enjoys the single largest advantage.  These two tendencies of the d’Hondt 
formula are important elements when it comes to explaining Portugal’s high breakeven point, 
favouritism toward large parties, and in particular toward the PSD compared to the PS in the 
small districts. In other words, in Portugal’s 10 districts with a small number of seats, even the 
medium-sized parties such as the Communists have found it difficult to win a seat.  For that 
reason alone, both the PSD and PS enjoy an advantage over the smaller parties, and as the single 
largest party in the small districts most of the time the PSD enjoys the single largest advantage.  
To see how these effects arise, we need to turn to the seats won by the parties in each district. 
Table 10 shows the number of seats, the party vote percentages, and the number of seats 
won in each of the 20 electoral districts for the 1999 Assembly election.  The first thing to notice 
is that only in districts with 10 or more seats did a party win a seat with less than 10% of the vote.  
Furthermore, the most disproportionate within-district results arise in the small districts, and the 
most directly proportionate results for the leading party in a district emerged in the largest 
districts.  On the small-district side,  Beja with three seats saw the PS win 67% of the seats (two 
of three) with 46.7% of the vote, and in Portalegre with three seats, the PS won 67% of the seats 
(two of three) with 51.3% of the vote.  On the large-district side, in Lisboa, the PS won 46.9% of 
the seats (23 of 49) with  42.6% of the vote; in Porto the PS won 51.4% of the seats (19 of 37) 
with 48.0% of the vote. 
[Table 10 about here] 
The message that is loud and clear here is that are that in all districts, regardless of district 
magnitude, the leading party enjoys a seat-to-vote advantage. And the smaller the district, the 
larger, generally, is that advantage, unless their regional base warrants substantial electoral effort 
For instance, the Communists are discouraged in small districts, except in the Alentejo districts of 
Beja and Évora.  The two large parties tend to enjoy highest vote support in districts with fewer 
than seven seats.8  To the PS and the PSD relative appeal in small districts, the d’Hondt formula 
adds a bonus.  
                                                     
8 The 1999 PS and PSD combined nationwide vote amounted to 76.3% of the total.  With the PSD doing 
especially poorly in Alentejo districts, the combined percentages of the two major parties is lower.  
Otherwise, in Viana do Castelo they won an average 76.0%, and in the other six small districts they won 
more than 80%. 
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Finally, though a strong inference would require more detailed analysis, the election 
results in Table 9 offer a strong suggestion that the small advantage over the PS comes from how 
the PSD’s relatively low vote support in Lisboa, Portalegre, and Setúbal.   These three 
districts had, in 1999, 50, 19, and 17 seats, respectively.  Other than districts in the Communist 
strongholds in the Alentejo, Lisboa, Portalegre, and Setúbal are the two districts where the PSD 
does relatively poorly.  The PS, on the other hand, performs at or about its nationwide average in 
these three districts.  Because the d’Hondt formula inflicts disadvantages to medium-sized parties 
in large districts, the PSD disadvantage for poor performance in a district is attenuated.  And, 
even though the PSD-to-PS advantage is small, if the PS held the advantage, it would almost 
surely have won a clear majority of the seats in 1999, instead of the exact 50% (115 seats) they 
did win.  That is, if the Lisboa area were divided into 10 five-seat districts, the PS almost surely 
would have had a parliamentary majority.  Alternatively, if Viana do Castelo, Vila Real, Viseu, 
the Açores, and Madeira formed one combined district of 30 seats, the PS would likely hold a 
majority. 
The development of the Portuguese party system during the nation’s 25-plus years of 
Democracia shows us something on the order of a two-and-a-half to three party system.  Each of 
three elements—a presidential office with real powers, legislative electoral rules, and a seemingly 
unidimensional issue space—tend to push the party system toward fewer rather than more parties.  
Under the political developments in the light of the push from presidential politics is it likely that 
the system may go even further toward a two-party model?  Today, that looks unlikely.  The 
ideological distances between the parties, especially the Communists and the PS, appear too large 
to allow a merger except for the temporary electoral convenience at the time of the majoritarian 
presidential contests.  The rules for electing the Assembly of the Republic—as long as there exist 
a few large districts, the Alentejo geographic Communist base, or both—provide real 
opportunities for the Communists.  For one thing, the party can retain its distinctive voice through 
the legislative elections and in the Assembly of the Republic itself.  Also, Communist leaders will 
be able to retain their positions of power, in the party organisation and in the Assembly.  Having 
the Communists stand on their on also saves the PS the effort of devising a strategy for trying to 
figure out how to structure a ballot that balances their politicians with politicians who, but for 
electoral disincentives, would prefer to stand for election as Communists.  The long-run fate of 
parties that have been standing to the right of the PSD is not so clear.  They do not appear to have 
any particularly strong regional base, similar to the Alentejo for the Communists.  And, after 
1976, their electoral size has never been so large as to lead anyone to believe that they can mount 
and sustain electoral efforts that will do much to put power in the hands of their leaders.  We can 
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well imagine that ambitious politicians on the Right will be able to find leadership positions 
within the PSD, reasonably congenial to their ideological leanings. This is the reason for the AD 
having recently resurfaced, died, and is a possibility.  
We have at this juncture, therefore, a vision of a Portuguese party system that lines up 
Right to Left with one major Right-leaning party, one major Left-of-Centre party, and a medium-
sized party somewhat on the distant Left in the Portuguese policy space.  Given, on the one hand, 
that it is the distance along the Left-Right spectrum that would seem to provide the motivation for 
the system not to contact to a two-party system and, on the other, that we are assuming there is  
no significant dimension other than Left-Right that might expand the system, we turn next to the 
evidence of the policy space of Portuguese politics to see what it can tell us. 
 
 
Electoral Strategies: Dimensionality of the Portuguese Policy Space 
 
Very little is known about the dimensionality of the Portuguese policy space. Only in the 
last decade did expert assessments include Portugal. But existing opinions to date do not tell the 
same story, leaving us with mixed impressions of what is really going on. 
In the last section on party competition, we learned that the Laver and Hunt expert study 
(1992) describe the Portuguese policy space to be unidimensional. John Huber and Ronald 
Inglehart (1995) appeared on the heels of Laver and Hunt  offering their take on the Left-Right 
dimension in 42 nations, among them Portugal. Arend Lijphart´s (1999) added his voice to the 
discussion of what he calls issue dimensions. What is interesting about these two studies is that 
they raise the question of whether the Portuguese policy space is really unidimensional. In 
contrast to Laver and Hunt´s public ownership category, Huber and Inglehart (1995, 89) identify 
“traditional vs. new culture” as the most salient category, where “traditional vs. new culture” 
refers to (1995, 78) “traditions, religious values, Catholic state, ecological sensitivity, idealism, 
pacifism, secularism, participation, culture, environment, religion, moral order and social 
conservatism”.  
Lijphart (1999, 80) suggests that there is more to the Portuguese policy space than the 
singular economic dimension. He claims there are 2.5 issue dimensions with socioeconomic 
issues being the most salient, followed by three other “medium-salience” issues: religion, regime 
support, and foreign policy issues. Lijphart also considers a “cultural-ethnic” issue category, but 
contrary to Huber and Inglehart, he does not think it is relevant in characterising the Portuguese 
policy space. 
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One message stands out clearly at  this point: there is nothing clear about what the 
Portuguese policy space looks like.  Laver and Hunt (1992) tell us one thing; Huber and Inglehart 
(1995) tell us something else, and so does Lijphart (1999). Their take on the matter is that there is 
an added complexity.  Huber and Inglehart and Lijphart disagree on exactly what that added 
complexity is.  In short, there is considerable wonderment as to how the parties organise 
themselves and no idea whatsoever as to the dynamics of party alignment in the policy space.  
 
A Closer Look at the Evidence 
 
Up until now, we have been dealing with static views of the Portuguese party positions. 
They capture snapshot positions, at best, of the time of the expert surveys. McDonald and Mendes 
(2001a) cast doubt on whether these static distinctions among party positions could accurately 
reflect the reality of the Party positions. This is because the expert studies were found to be highly 
stable. But as McDonald and Mendes (2001a), using Comparative Manifesto Project data, show, 
the parties can and do move about strategically in the short run without straying too far along the 
Left-Right dimension. Being stable, the expert studies cannot assess party movements. The CMP 
data allow one to draw inferences about the party dynamics since they report on what the parties 
say at each election point in time.  
As Mendes and McDonald (2001b) later qualify, short run party dynamics can occur 
because parties change the emphasis they give to specific issues by placing more emphasis on 
some issues compared to the others, by purposefully placing less emphasis on other issues, or by 
paying attention to categories that may be largely new to their party programmes. Would it not be 
interesting to see how, if at all, any redimensioning has occurred in the Portuguese policy space 
and still more interesting yet to see why and the part of which parties?  
 
Issue Salience  
A preliminary look at the descriptive evidence on the salience of the issue domains and 
categories will help us with what to expect when exploring the dimensionality of the Portuguese 
space. This is because the dimensionality as assessed by the manifestos is extracted under a 
coding scheme that was founded on saliency theory to begin with (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 
1987; McDonald and Mendes 2001a).  
The means of the seven CMP domains tell us how much the parties have been referring to or 
emphasizing them; in other words, they tell us about the salience or importance of the issue 
categories to the parties: External Relations (8.3), Freedom & Democracy (13.4), Political System 
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(7.5),i Economy (18.9), Welfare & Quality of Life (19.1), Fabric of Society (3.4), and Social 
Groups (10.3). As is easily seen, “Fabric of Society” is the domain receiving the least mention, so 
much so that we exclude it from any dimensional analyses that we perform. Interesting to note as 
of yet is that this is precisely the domain equivalent to Huber and Inglehart´s “tradition vs. new 
culture” category.  So at this point, we are already doubtful of what these experts tell us since the 
evidence does not support these authors´ premise regarding the primary issue of concern to the 
Portuguese parties. Economy (Domain 4) and Welfare and Quality of Life (Domain 5) are the 
dominant foci of the parties, with Freedom and Democracy (Freedom & Demcracy) coming in a 
distant third.  
Table 11 shows these means as well other descriptive statistics of the data we are 
employing to assess the dimensionality of the Portuguese policy space. Also featured in Table 11 
are the descriptive statistics of the 20-year period divided into two sub-periods: 1975-1983 
elections and the 1985-1995 elections.9  
[Table 11 about here] 
If we compare across sub-periods, we see that economic matters dominated the first half 
of this 20-year period with a mean of 17.49.  In these first ten years of democratic history, 
however, it is Domain 2—especially the appeal to democracy and the democratic regime, the 
promotion of the constitution and the freedoms it awarded—that occupied the second most 
important domain to Portuguese parties with a mean of 16.77; and close behind was Welfare and 
Quality of Life with a mean of 16.26. Not too far off was Domain 7, Social Groups—particularly 
the concern for the well-being of the farming society and the establishment of labour unions. 
Social and environmental concerns clearly began receiving more emphasis in the latter 
half of the period under consideration, as Table 12 specifies more in a more detailed fashion. 
Most of the favourable mention categories in this Domain gained in emphasis in the last ten years. 
When the economy began to come under some long-awaited control in the mid 80s, the political 
stability that followed and accompanied it allowed the parties to turn to building infrastructure 
and improving the quality of life. 
[Table 12 about here] 
One domain whose emphasis is clearly overstated when only considering the whole 
period is that of Domain 2, Freedom & Democracy. Party mentions of freedom and democracy  
                                                     
9 Critics may argue whether the 1987 election should have been the election separating the two periods 
because it was Cavaco Silva´s second win  in 1987 that gave him a governing majority for the first time in 
democratic history. We chose to include the 1985 election given that we are considering a possible 
disjunction in time due to stability—both economic and political—and since we are assuming the EU entry 
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received considerably less emphasis in the latter part of the period under analysis—about half of 
what it was getting before. On the flipside, Domain 3´s salience, Political System,  nearly doubled 
from the pre-85 period to the post-85 period.10 
Table 13 shows a breakdown of the mean emphases of the four major parties. All four 
parties have been concerned with welfare questions, mostly especially the PSP and PSD. It also 
shows that the most Left-leaning party, PCP, emphasised questions of freedom and democracy far 
more than any other party. In fact in the last ten years, it was the only major party still heavily 
focused on these issues when the remaining major players had moved on to other issues. Social 
matters, as well as agricultural and labour groups have long been important to the Communists 
(PCP), with the latter more so in the first ten years and welfare and social issues in the last ten. 
The economic categories most concentrated on are, as would be expected, Marxist-related 
categories. 
[Table 13 about here] 
Market-oriented statements have been a major part of the Christian Democrats´ or the 
Popular Party (PP) programmes, more so than the Socialists (PSP) and Social Democrats (PSD). 
All three of these parties to the left of PCP have been concerned with productivity, infrastructure, 
and other economic goals—most of all the PSD—as well as governmental and administrative 
efficiency—most of all the PP at the Right.  In fact, the Populists´ interest in political matters has 
only grown over the years, as a comparison of the means shows.  
  
Dimensionality of the Policy Space 
 
We have, at this point, a  pretty good idea of what to expect in the dimensional analysis, 
that of two overall factors that define the party space: an economic and social dimension. 
Potentially a third and fourth factor coming from the External Relations and Social Groups 
domains in defining the principal underlying dimensions in Portuguese democratic history. What 
we know that there has been some strategic manoeuvering on the party of the Portuguese parties. 
                                                                                                                                                              
year as the beginning of less volatile economic times for the Portuguese economy, 1985 seemed to be a 
reasonable choice (see Gallagher, 1986, 1988).  
10 The category labeled Political Authority is dropped from all of our analyses due the considerable  
emphasis that all of the parties place on political authority (see Appendix Table 1), so much so that the 
Communist Party is more Right-leaning than the extreme Rightist in Europe. Keeping it would produce 
unreliable estimates. The Portuguese experience with the overthrow of the authoritarian regime made the 
parties emphasise the importance of the new regime. Keeping this category in the analyses would only 
skew the results.  
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But solely looking at the issue salience across the board from 1975-95 does not allow us to say 
this. It is misleading with respect to what issues the parties hold dear to them. 
The first stage factor analysis allowed us to extract one factor within each domain (except 
for Domain 6 as discussed above) using Principal Components method and Varimax rotation. 
Table 14 reports the factor loadings of the first stage factor analysis using CMP data (Volkens 
2001) for the period covering all legislative elections since the first government during the period 
1975-95. Table 15 reports on the factor loadings for each of two sub-periods we thought 
interesting to analyse separately, given the relevance of the crossover period in Portuguese 
political and economic stability, before and after the 1985 election period. 
[Table 14 and 15 about here] 
Across the entire period, we extracted a factor that we are designating as “Good 
International Relations” in the External Relations domain. All of the issue categories receiving a 
substantial amount of attention (a CMP score of equal to or greater than 1.00) load on or about .6. 
That which is leads the Portuguese parties to make statements about the Nation´s positive 
international and good military relations also makes them speak negatively about anti-imperialism 
and negative military interventions. In the Freedom & Democracy domain, we extracted a 
“Democratic or Civic Rights or Freedoms” factor on which most all categories load on or about 
.7. In the third domain, Political System, the issue categories load on a factor “Better 
Government” about .8. As in the previous domain, most parties seem to agree on matters of 
democratic freedom. In the next  three domains, we extracted an “Economic Growth”, a “Social 
Concern/Quality of Life”, and an “Economic Groups. On the Economic factor, the issue 
categories loaded about .6 on free market issues, with the exception of Marxist-like statements. 
The parties are divided in that the those parties making favorable statements about issues like free 
enterprise and other free-market oriented issues also make negative statements on Marxist-
oriented and market regulated issues. On the question of Quality of Life, most issue categories 
loaded on this factor on or about .8. The same occurs with the Economic Groups factor. And we 
get fairly the same picture when our analysis of this 20-year period. 
Figures 6 A-F illustrate the individual party scores on each of the six first-stage factors by 
election. Two things deserve notice: the factor extracted with Domain 2 or the Democratic/Civic 
Rights or Freedoms factor shown in Figure 6B and the Domain 7 or Economic Groups factor 
shown in Figure 6F. In both cases, the parties are positioned very close to one another, especially 
following the 1975 and 1976 elections. This means that they are pretty much in agreement on 
these matters and, therefore, we would not expect them to organize themselves along any 
distinguishable dimension.  
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[Figures 6 A-F about here] 
 
In order to more clearly define the Portuguese policy space, we further reduced these six 
factors in a subsequent factor analysis. Table 16 shows the results of the second stage analysis for 
all three periods and Figures 7 A-C plot the resulting factors against one another:  Factor 1 on the 
horizontal axis and the Factor 2 on the vertical axis. Here, factors with eigenvalues above 1.00 
were extracted, again using the Principal Components extraction method. The factor loadings 
shown in Table 16 are the Varimax rotated figures. Two factors were extracted, however, as the 
depiction in Figures 7A-C communicates,  there appears to be really only one dimension, a 
dimension similar to the Left-Right dimension. And this is so regardless of whether we are 
considering the entire period or the two sub-periods, before and after political and economic 
stability, although the picture is clearer when we factor analyse the first 10 years of democracy 
(see Figure 8B).  Looking at Table 16 and Figure 7, we can see that one factor creates the 
suspicion of a possible second dimension: that of “Democratic and Civic Rights”. This factor fails 
to conform to the general tendency we observe, but the lack of fit on freedom and democracy may 
very well be a matter of consensus just as Figure 7B shows. What is happening here is that the 
parties by and large agree on matters of this nature. Given the lack of distinction among them on 
these questions, it is fair to expect that they would not organize themselves in the same way as 
they would on Left-Right matters. And indeed they do not. 
[Table 16  and Figures 7 A-C about here] 
Given that we are excluding the possibility of a second dimension, our final depiction in 
Figure 8 represents the Portuguese policy space as we see it: a unidimensional space, with the 
parties moving around strategically from one election to the next, in conformity with our salience 
analysis,  but by and large organising themselves according to a general Left-Right dimension. In 
this way our analysis confirms that Laver and Hunt (1992) were right on the mark about the 
Portuguese policy space. It does appear to be unidimensional. But our story goes beyond what 
Laver and Hunt, as well as any other expert assessment, can tell us.  We not only effectively show 
how the parties align themselves along this singular dimension, but we are also able to say 
something about the party dynamics. The evidence shows that there is considerable strategic 
movement or change through time, at least on the part of the four major parties. This change or 
movement reflects a contracting party system, with the parties moving closer to one another 
towards the Centre from one election to the next. Figure 8 shows two things: 1) the contracting 
tendency; but 2) it also reveals how the parties, particularly the smaller parties, the PP and the 
PCP, adapted to this changing environment.  
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[Figure 8 about here] 
As we can see from Figure 8, party movement is common among all four parties. In the 
beginning, the parties were strategically closer to the Left, not wanting to be associated with the 
Right. Indeed, the Constitution of 1976 is Leftist sounding, even today. But in the late 70s, the 
parties became office-seekers because they began to approach the Centre of the political 
spectrum. The consequence was a compression in the party system.  The greatest contribution to 
this compression was the PS movement toward the Right.  In the first two elections, in 1975 and 
1976, the PS was very close to the Communists on the Left, but then it took off to the Right and, 
but for the in early 1980s elections, stayed there. In a couple of cases it actually leap-frogged the 
PSD on the Left-Right dimension. This left the PCP, although also having moved toward the 
especially when in alliance with the Greens, with the most Leftist place in the policy space. In this 
way,  the PCP secured its survival by remaining a clear Leftist option to the Portuguese 
electorate. Also presenting itself as a distinct policy option is the PP, generally in the Right-most 
position in the last ten years. It strategically sought to disassociate itself from the PSD following 
the breakup of  the AD, thus providing a distinct policy choice to the public. 
 
 Conclusion 
This study tells a story of the Portuguese party system and the dimensionality of its policy 
space in times of mounting pressure in Europe for parties to innovate. It is essentially a story of 
the changing environment of the party system and the strategic survival behaviour of the parties.  
We began by describing the Portuguese party system, where it came from, how it developed and 
adapted to a changing environment. Our main purpose was to explore what strategic changes, if 
any,  had occurred.  
Our principal message is one of compression. The Portuguese party system has 
contracted throughout it democratic history with the parties largely behaving in a Downsian, 
office-seeking way approaching the middle of the political spectrum. Throughout this paper, we 
have argued and effectively shown evidence pointing to three main forces contributing to this 
compression tendency: 1) the characteristics of the electoral system—particularly the nature of 
the presidential powers, the vote-to-seat-translation rule, d´Hondt, and the geographics and size of 
the electoral districts— 2) the societal cleavages; and 3) the unidimensional policy space itself.  
These features of the Portuguese society and party system are not likely to change, at 
least not in the near future. That means that one can expect the tendency for Portugal to have a 
small number of effective parties is likely to continue. And this has important implications for 
those smaller parties that have up until now been able to compete, and wish to continue 
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competing for a few seats in parliament, with the two largest Centrist parties, the PS and the PSD. 
In the Portuguese case, these smaller parties are the PCP and the PP. The only option these parties 
have to survive in the trend of contraction is through the issue dimensions. Depending on where 
they position themselves along the Left-Right dimension, they can offer more distinct policy 
choices to the Portuguese electorate. In this way, they have a chance at successfully adapting to 
the system environment.  
To sum up, in the end our analyses allowed us to, not only check the expert opinions of 
the Portuguese party and policy space—among which we stand with those of Laver and Hunt 
(1992) about the unidimensionality of the Portuguese policy space—, but also to track the 
dynamics of the system, that is, the strategic manoeuvering of the parties. In this way, we expand 
on what has thus far been said about the Portuguese party system.  We learn two addition things. 
First, throughout its democratic history, the party system is contracting, and second, the only 
viable option for party survival depends on how they, particularly the smaller parties, pronounce 
themselves on the issues.  
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Table 1: Legislative Vote Shares by Party in the First Republic, 1910-26 
 
 
Constituint 
Assembly 1911-15 1915-17 1918-19 1919-21 1921  1922-25 1925-26 
Parties N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Republicanos 229 97.8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Independentes 3 1.2 19 12.1 13 8 5 3.2 13 7.9 5 3 5 3 19 11.6 
Socialistas 2 0.8 3 1.9 2 1.2 - - 8 4.9 - - - - 2 1.2 
Democráticos - - 82 52.5 106 63.8 - - 86 52.7 54 33.1 71 43.5 83 50.9 
Evolucionistas - - 41 26.2 26 15.6 - - 38 23.3 - - - - - - 
Unionistas - - 36 23 15 9 - - 17 10.4 - - - - - - 
I.R. - - 1 0.6 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Católicos - - - - 1 0.6 5 3.2 1 .6 3 1.8 5 3 4 2.4 
P.N.R. - - - - - - 108 69.6 - - - - - - - - 
Monárquicos - - - - - - 37 23.8 - - 4 2.4 13 7.9 7 4.2 
P.R. - - - - - - - - 9 5.5 12 7.3 17 10.4 - - 
Liberais - - - - - - - - - - 79 48.4 33 20.2 - - 
Dissidentes - - - - - - - - - - 3 1.8 - - - - 
Regionalistas - - - - - - - - - - 2 1.2 2 1.2 - - 
Populares - - - - - - - - - - 1 0.6 - - - - 
Governamentais - - - - - - - - - - - - 13 7.9 - - 
Nacionalistas - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 36 22 
Esquerdistas - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 3.6 
U.I.E. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 3.6 
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Table 2:  Portuguese Party Attachment and Left-Right Self-Positioninng, EuroBarometer 
Data 1986-1994 
 
 Party Attachment  Left -Right Scale  
Years Very Close Fairly Close Sympathise Not Close Left Centre Right 
1986 6.7 18.7 45.2 29.4 5.6 81.1  13.2 
1987 2.0 10.8 53.1 34.1 14.6 63.6  21.8 
1988 1.5 10.9 52.8 34.8 17.0 63.1 19.2 
1989 2.9 7.8 53.2 36.1 32.1 41.3 26.6 
1990 2.5 7.1 46.2 44.2 22.9 34.5  42.6 
 1991 6.2 11.8 53.6 28.5 23.4 43.8  32.8 
 1992 2.1 8.3 59.2 30.4 24.6 48.9  26.4 
1993 2.5 7.6 54.1 35.9 24.2 33.0  42.9 
1994 1.9 6.9 53.8 37.4 30.8 55.34 13.9 
 
*Cell entries are percentages. 
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Table 3: Cross-tabulation of Left-Right Self-Placement with Party Most Voted For in Recent Elections, 
EuroBarometer Data, 1986-1996 
 
 
 
  1986   1987   1988   1989   1990  
Parties L C R L C R L C R L C R L C R 
PCP 42.3 12.0 20.0 25.0 5.5 4.8 24.1 3.1 2.4 3.4 ------ .1 28.3 1.9 .6 
PS 42.3 36.9 25.0 57.5 56.7 56.2 66.0 43.4 10.3 83.1 52.4 12.2 67.7 68.6 15.9 
PSD 7.7 45.1 46.7 5.0 26.9 19.2 12.9 46.3 65.3 3.8 10.6 11.6 3.0 28.3 72.9 
PP 3.8 5.8 8.3 12.5 10.8 19.9 ----- 8.9 22.1 9.6 37.0 76.1 1.0 1.3 10.0 
 
 
 
 
 
               
  1991   1992   1993   1994   1996  
Parties L C R L C R L C R L C R L C R 
PCP 27.1 .4 ------ 26.4 .7 .6 25.0 2.4 .5 27.4 2.8 ------ 2.6 .3 ------ 
PS 66.7 39.7 10.2 63.9 43.1 8.3 64.7 65.3 7.4 59.8 44.1 2.7 88.9 56.8 13.2 
PSD 5.4 56.9 82.2 8.3 53.2 82.1 7.8 30.6 82.9 9.8 50.0 90.5 1.7 7.9 14.0 
PP ------ 2.2 6.1 ----- 2.2 8.3 .9 .6 7.9 1.2 2.4 5.4 6.9 35.0 72.8 
 
*Cell entries are percentages. 
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Table 4: Voter Turnout in the Legislative Elections in the Portuguese Districts, 1975-1999 
 
Districts 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 
Aveiro .918 .848 .883 .860 .788 .755 .742 .704 .686 .634 
Beja .918 .841 .868 .842 .781 .744 .677 .635 .641 .587 
Braga .930 .878 .913 .893 .820 .788 .763 .723 .711 .674 
Bragança .908 .788 .843 .797 .695 .654 .650 .609 .591 .547 
Castelo Branco .906 .810 .862 .839 .762 .738 .712 .677 .673 .637 
Coimbra .891 .778 .841 .815 .746 .711 .697 .665 .664 .616 
Évora .943 .884 .906 .894 .837 .807 .754 .701 .694 .622 
Faro .906 .805 .846 .834 .770 .741 .702 .663 .642 .575 
Guarda .919 .822 .880 .836 .740 .713 .695 .651 .598 .596 
Leiria .898 .802 .863 .835 .770 .734 .721 .672 .656 .619 
Lisboa .919 .832 .876 .864 .806 .776 .736 .684 .671 .618 
Portalegre .944 .870 .891 .880 .822 .800 .749 .713 .704 .635 
Porto .938 .882 .906 .891 .820 .787 .780 .723 .710 .650 
Santarém .917 .823 .863 .850 .782 .764 .726 .689 .680 .622 
Setúbal .934 .851 .884 .870 .819 .795 .728 .680 .677 .605 
Viana do Castelo .886 .789 .843 .818 .749 .719 .701 .650 .644 .608 
Vila Real .893 .778 .843 .808 .721 .665 .674 .615 .599 .568 
Viseu .892 .784 .854 .820 .736 .690 .693 .634 .612 .585 
Açores .903 .781 .830 .762 .666 .601 .540 .579 .565 .503 
Madeira .891 .782 .852 .807 .731 .695 .672 .645 .647 .583 
Average 
 
.913 .821 .867 .841 .768 .734 .706 .666 .653 .604 
*Cell entries are proportions.
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Table 5: Illustration of Inflation of Electoral Rolls, 1991 
 
 
 
District 
A 
1991   
Population 
Count 
B 
1991  
Population  
19 or Under 
Count 
C 
1991 
Registration 
Count 
D 
  (A-B)  
Persons 
Theoretically 
Eligible to 
Register 
F 
(C-D)  
Inflation of 
Electoral 
Rolls Count 
G 
Percentage 
of Inflation 
in 1991 
Aveiro   667314 197300   526727 470014 56713 12.07 
Beja   165261 41234   152597 124027 28570 23.04 
Braga   776254 260771   587337 515483 71854 64.08 
Bragança   155423 43290   148876 112133 36743 32.77 
Castelo Branco   209948 50824   199654 159124 40530 25.47 
Coimbra   425211 107450   370925 317761 53164 16.73 
Évora   171143 42812   149495 128331 21164 16.49 
Faro   339836 86730   293573 253106 40467 15.99 
Guarda   184337 47967   173630 136370 37260 27.32 
Leiria   427633 112954   358145 314679 43466 13.81 
Lisboa 2057562 530589 1796885 1526973 269912 17.68 
Portalegre   130706 30145   117052 100561 16491 16.40 
Porto 1686884 506438 1319056 1180446 138610 11.74 
Santarém   440006 112019   385602 327987 57615 17.57 
Setúbal   719347 198303   595534 521044 74490 14.30 
V. do Castelo   242371 72937  214800 169434 45366 26.78 
Vila Real   236594 720929  213334 164495 48839 29.69 
Viseu   402273 122964  344478 379309 65169 17.18 
Açores   239190 84260  181018 154930 26088 16.84 
Madeira   250550 86887  193763 163663 30100 18.39 
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Table 6: Vote and Seat Legislative Election Results by Party, 1975-99 
 
                                                          Party Percentages 
                    Effective 
       Left    APU/CDU                                         AD       Right        Number  
Election    Faction       MDP         PCP            PS            PSD         CDS/PP     Faction     of Parties 
 
1975 
Vote%          0.8            4.4            13.5            40.7         28.3            8.2                3.66 
Seat%           0.4            2.0            12.0            46.4         32.4            6.4              2.95 
 
1976 
Vote%          1.8            ----           15.3            36.7          25.2          16.7           4.00 
Seat%           0.4            ----           15.2            40.7          27.8          16.0                    3.43  
 
1979 
Vote%          2.8                   19.5                    28.2                     46.3                     3.00 
Seat%           0.4                   18.8                    29.6                     51.2       2.60 
 
1980  
Vote%          2.4                   17.3                    28.7                     48.3                     2.89 
Seat%           0.4                   16.4                    29.6                     53.6               2.49 
 
1983 
Vote%         0.7                   18.7                    37.3           27.8            12.7                    3.73 
Seat%          0.0                   17.2                    40.4           30.0            12.0       3.36 
 
1985  
Vote%         20.4                  16.0                    21.4           30.6           10.0                4.78 
Seat%          18.0                  15.2                    22.8           35.2             8.8                4.18 
 
1987  
Vote%         6.5                    12.5                    22.8           51.3             4.4                 2.98 
Seat%          2.8                    12.4                    24.0           59.2             1.6                    2.36 
 
1991  
Vote%         2.6                      9.0                    29.6           51.0             4.4           1.7     2.79 
Seat%          0.0                      7.4                    30.9           57.4             2.2           0.4     2.32 
 
1995    
Vote%         1.9                     8.7                     44.6            34.8            9.2                0.2     2.97 
Seat%          0.0                     6.5                     48.7            38.2            6.5  0.0     2.55 
 
1999 
Vote%          2.5                    9.2                    44.9             33.0           8.5                                  3.06 
Seat%           0.9                    7.4                    50.0             35.2           6.5                                  2.61 
 
Note: For the purpose of exposition, cell entries for the Left faction only include the following parties: UDP, PSR, PRD, 
PCTP/MRPP; the Right faction  refers to PSN.  
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Table 7:  Presidential Election Results by Candidate, 1976-2001 
 
 
                   Effective 
                 Number of 
Year            Vote% Party Support  Candidate              Parties 
 
 
1976               61.5 PS + PSD + PP           António dos Santos Ramalho Eanes  2.31 
                       16.5 Independent           Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho 
          14.4 Independent           José Baptista Pinheiro de Azevedo 
            7.6 PCP            Octávio Pato 
 
 
1980               56.5    PS + PCP           António dos Santos Ramalho Eanes  2.12 
                39.0 PSD + PP            Francisco Sá Carneiro 
                         1.5 Independent           Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho 
            0.8  Independent           Carlos Galvão de Melo 
                         0.8  Independent           António Pires Veloso 
      0.2 POUS            António Aires Rodrigues 
 
 
1986    46.3 PSD           Diogo Pinto Freitas do Amaral   3.15 
  First   25.4 PS           Mário Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares 
  Round   20.9 PRD + PCP          Francisco Salgado Zenha 
                  7.4 Independent          María de Lourdes Pintasilgo 
 
1986               51.3 PS + PCP          Mário Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares  NA 
   Runoff         48.7 PP + PSD          Diogo Pinto Freitas do Amaral 
 
 
1991               70.4 PS + PSD          Mário Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares  1.87 
          14.1 PP           Basílio Aldolfo Mendonça Horta da França 
          12.9 PCP           Carlos Alberto do Vale Gomes Carvalhas 
            2.2 UDP           Carlos Manuel Marques da Silva 
       
 
1996               53.8 PS + PCP           Jorge Fernando Branco de Sampaio  1.99 
          47.2 PSD           Aníbal Cavaco Silva 
     
 
2001               55.8 PS            Jorge Fernando Branco de Sampaio  2.30 
          34.5 PSD           Joaquim Ferreira do Amaral 
            5.1 PCP           António Simões de Abreu 
            3.0 BE           Fernando Rosas 
            1.6  PCTP           António Garcia Pereira 
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Table 8: Salience and Positions on  Eight Policy Issues of Major Portuguese Parties  
 
 PCP  PS  PSD  PP  
Issues Score Salience Score Salience Score Salience Score Salience
Increase in services vs. Cut in Taxes  3.43 12.86 8.75 11.63 14.00 12.40 17.00 15.00 
Pro-friendly relations vs. Anti-friendly with Former USSR 1.14 13.71 7.88 12.00 13.00 10.50 15.86 12.29 
Pro-Public Ownership vs. Anti-Public Ownership 1.14 18.86 9.50 14.00 13.83 15.00 18.14 16.86 
Pro-Permissive vs. Anti-Permissive Social Policy 2.67 16.43 8.00 14.38 12.40 13.17 18.17 12.14 
Anticlerical vs. Proclerical 2.71 4.83 9.63 7.57 13.50 8.40 19.29 16.67 
Pro-Urban Interests vs. Anti Urban Interests 7.00 10.83 8.29 10.43 10.80 9.20 16.50 13.17 
Pro-Decentralization vs. Centralization of Decisions 13.83 13.33 8.57 13.29 11.60 13.40 12.50 11.00 
Environment vs. Growth 5.83 13.17 9.86 11.00 12.60 10.80 13.83 7.67 
 
Note: These are the results of a survey of expert opinions on party positions conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992, 286-91) 
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Table 9: Actual and Hypothetical Apportionment of the Legislative Seats among 20 
Districts, 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
District 
1991 
Population 
Count 
1991 
Registration 
Count 
1991 
Actual Seat 
Apportionment 
1991 Precise 
Apportionment 
Pop. Basis 
 1991 Precise 
Apportionment 
Regis. Basis 
Aveiro   667314   526727 14 15.19 14.30 
Beja   165261   152597   4   3.76   4.14 
Braga   776254   587337 16 17.67 15.95 
Bragança   155423   148876   4   3.54   4.04 
Castelo Branco   209948   199654   5   4.78   5.42 
      
Coimbra   425211   370925 10   9.68 10.07 
Évora   171143   149495   4   3.90   4.06 
Faro   339836   293573   8   7.74   7.97 
Guarda   184337   173630   4   4.20   4.71 
Leiria   427633   358145 10   9.73   9.73 
      
Lisboa 2057562 1796885 50 46.84 48.80 
Portalegre   130706   117052   3   2.98   3.18 
Porto 1686884 1319056 37 38.40 35.82 
Santarém   440006   385602 10 10.02 10.47 
Setúbal   719347   595534 16 16.38 16.17 
      
Viana do Castelo   242371  214800   6   5.52   5.83 
Vila Real   236594  213334   6   5.39   5.79 
Viseu   402273  344478   9   9.16   9.35 
Açores   239190  181018   5   5.44   4.92 
Madeira   250550  193763   5   5.70   5.26 
      
 
TOTAL 
 
9927843 
 
8322481 
 
226 
 
 226 
 
 226 
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Table 10: Percentage of Votes and Seats Won by Parties in each of 20 Districts, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
District 
 
Number 
of Seats 
in the  
District 
 
 
PS 
 
Vote% 
        Seats 
 
PSD 
 
Vote% 
        Seats 
 
PCP-PEV 
 
Vote% 
          Seats 
 
CDS 
 
Vote% 
          Seats 
 
BE 
 
Vote% 
          Seats 
 
 
Aveiro 
 
15 
40.2% 
              7 
38.3% 
            6 
  3.5% 
                  -- 
13.6% 
              2 
  1.3% 
                 -- 
 
Beja 
 
  3 
46.7% 
                2 
14.5% 
               -- 
28.3% 
                 1 
  3.9% 
                 -- 
  2.0% 
                 -- 
 
Braga 
 
17 
44.3% 
                8 
36.8% 
               7 
  5.4% 
                 1 
  8.8%  
                  1 
  1.7% 
                 -- 
 
Bragança 
 
  4 
39.7% 
                2 
44.9% 
               2 
  2.6% 
                 -- 
  8.6% 
                 -- 
  0.8% 
                 -- 
 
Castelo Branco 
 
  5 
51.7% 
                3 
31.9% 
               2 
  5.3% 
                 -- 
  6.3% 
                 -- 
  1.2% 
                 -- 
 
Coimbra 
 
10 
47.1% 
                6 
35.2% 
               4 
  6.1% 
                 -- 
  6.0% 
                 -- 
  2.0% 
                 -- 
 
Évora 
 
  4 
45.6% 
                2 
18.7% 
               1 
24.6% 
                 1 
  5.0% 
                 -- 
  1.7% 
                 -- 
 
Faro 
 
  8 
48.4% 
                5 
29.4% 
               3 
  8.3% 
                 -- 
  7.3% 
                 -- 
  2.3% 
                 -- 
 
Guarda 
 
  4 
43.3% 
                2 
39.2% 
               2 
  3.2% 
                 -- 
  9.8% 
                 -- 
  1.1% 
                 -- 
 
Leiria 
 
10 
36.8% 
                4 
42.6% 
               5 
  5.3% 
                 -- 
  9.9% 
                  1 
  1.7% 
                 -- 
 
Lisboa 
 
49 
42.6% 
              23 
27.3% 
             14 
12.3% 
                 6 
  8.5% 
                  4 
  4.9% 
                 2 
 
Portalegre 
 
  3 
51.3% 
                2 
22.6% 
               1 
15.1% 
                 -- 
  5.9% 
                 -- 
  1.2% 
                 -- 
 
Porto 
  
37 
48.0% 
              19 
32.7% 
             13 
  6.3% 
                 2 
  7.5% 
                  3 
  2.3% 
                 -- 
 
Santarém 
 
10 
45.5% 
                5 
30.2% 
               3 
10.1% 
                 1 
  8.1% 
                  1 
  2.0% 
                 -- 
 
Setúbal 
 
17 
43.7% 
                8 
18.0% 
               3 
24.8% 
                 5 
  5.6% 
                  1 
  1.1% 
                 -- 
 
Viana do Castelo 
 
  6 
40.2% 
                3 
35.8% 
               2 
  5.0% 
                 -- 
14.0% 
                  1 
  1.2% 
                 -- 
 
Vila Real 
 
  5 
40.8% 
                2 
45.4% 
               3 
  2.4% 
                 -- 
  6.9% 
                 -- 
  0.8% 
                 -- 
 
Viseu 
 
  9 
38.2% 
                4 
44.3% 
               4 
  2.2% 
                 -- 
10.5% 
                  1 
  1.2% 
                 -- 
 
Açores 
 
  5 
53.3% 
                3 
35.8% 
               2 
  1.7% 
                 -- 
  5.6% 
                 -- 
  1.1% 
                 -- 
 
Maderia 
 
  5 
35.1% 
                2 
46.3% 
               3 
  2.8% 
                 -- 
 10.6% 
                 -- 
  1.2% 
                 -- 
 
TOTALS 
 
 
226 
 
44.0% 
         112 
 
32.3% 
             80 
 
 9.0% 
                17 
 
 8.4% 
                15 
 
 2.5% 
                 2 
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Table 11: Means of the Seven Domains of the Comparative Manifestos Project Data 
 
 
 
Domains 
Entire 
Period 
   Before 
1985 
   After 
 1983 
   
 Mean StD Min Max Mean StD Min Max Mean StD Min Max 
Domain 1  External Relations 8.286 5.134 0.00 26.26 7.855 4.419 .80 22.97 8.906 6.062 0.00 26.26 
Domain 2  Freedom and Democracy 13.379 11.856 0.00 50.96 16.766 13.719 0.00 50.96 8.503 5.916 0.00 27.08 
Domain 3  Political System 7.475 6.193 0.00 30.36 5.867 4.499 0.00 14.20 9.791 7.542 1.04 30.36 
Domain 4  Economy 18.926 10.746 0.00 51.25 17.490 8.983 0.00 42.86 21.096 12.756 .93 51.25 
Domain 5  Welfare & Quality of Life 19.127 12.433 0.00 59.38 16.256 12.335 0.00 59.38 23.260 11.591 4.88 49.49 
Domain 6  Fabric of Society 3.439 3.469 0.00 12.50 3.934 3.979 0.00 12.50 2.726 2.468 0.00 8.65 
Domain 7  Social Groups 10.305 6.219 0.00 34.40 12.079 6.811 0.00 34.40 7.751 4.185 0.00 16.67 
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Table 12: Means in Top Ten Categories of the Comparative Manifestos Project Data 
 
 
Domains and Categories Entire 
Period 
Before 
1985 
After     
1983 
Domain 1 External Relations    
European Community  3.745 
Domain 2 Freedom and Democracy  
Freedom and Human Rights 2.993  
Democracy 8.065 10.686 4.290 
Constitutionalism 3.087  
Domain 3 Political System   
Governmental and Adm. Efficiency 3.635 2.811 4.822 
Domain 4 Economy    
Enterprise, Incentives, & Market Reg.   
Economic Orthodoxy and Goals 3.235  4.446 
Infrastructure 3.121  4.590 
Domain 5 Welfare & Quality of Life    
Environmental Protectionism 3.565 2.718 4.786 
Social Justice 3.735 3.078 4.681 
Welfare 5.636 4.563 7.181 
Education 3.531 3.421 3.690 
Domain 7 Social Groups   
Labour 3.870 4.418 3.082 
Agriculture and Farmers 3.757 4.629  
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Table 13: Breakdown of the Means of Top Categories Comparative Manifestos Project by Major Party   
 
 
  1975-95    1975-83    1985-95   
Domains and Categories PCP PS PSD PP PCP PS PSD PP PCP PS PSD PP 
Domain 1 External Relations             
Anti-Imperialism 3.019    3.774 2.879       
Internationalism             
Peace             
European Community    4.206      3.979 3.624 8.230 
Domain 2 Freedom & Democracy          
Freedom and Human Rights 2.938  3.946  3.106 5.924  2.265    
Democracy 12.579 7.420 3.920 14.649 11.518 5.674 7.917 
Constitutionalism 3.250 2.848  3.897 3.273   
Domain 3 Political System        
Centralisation & Decentralisation        4.943     
Governmental & Adm. Efficiency  5.800 5.780 6.608  4.885 4.885 3.276 2.683 6.943 6.943 10.772 
Domain 4 Economy             
Free Enterprise    3.764   3.612    3.954 
Incentives  3.061       3.785   
Economic Orthodoxy    6.085   5.306  3.999 3.977 7.057 
Market Regulation            3.290 
Marxist Analysis 2.235    2.797        
Productivity 1.890  4.317  2.045   3.370   6.102  
Economic Goals  4.627 5.174 4.238  3.684 3.447 3.644 5.807 7.333 4.981 
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Domains and Categories PCP PS PSD PP PCP PS PSD PP PCP PS PSD PP 
Infrastructure 5.519 5.545 4.182  3.129 4.711  3.117 8.508 6.587 5.817 
Domain 5 Welfare & Quality of Life             
Culture     3.236  3.953  3.717  
Social Justice 3.009  6.149 3.668 1.992  7.823  5.423 4.833 4.057 4.823 
Environmental Protection       2.284   4.294 
Welfare 4.559 7.675 7.166 6.907 2.738 7.675 5.928 5.171 6.440 9.063 8.713 9.076 
Education 6.562 3.788 4.242  6.562 3.869 5.281 2.364 10.215 3.687  
Domain 7 Social Groups        
Labour 5.988 3.862  6.503 3.402  4.390 5.988  
Agriculture and Farmers 3.950 5.273 4.026 3.641 4.114 7.697 4.665 3.604  4.438   
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Table 14: Results of First Stage Factor Analysis, 1975-95 
 1975-95 
Domains and Categories Factor 
Domain 1 External Relations  
Foreign Relations Pos .668
Internationalism Pos .367
Military Pos .793
Military Neg -.547
European Community Pos .525
Anti-Imperialism -.527
Domain 2 Freedom & Democracy 
Freedom & Human Rights .725
Democracy .725
Constitutionalism Pos -.002
Domain 3 Political System  
Centralisation & Decentralisation .703
Governmental & Adm. Efficiency .619
Political Corruption .687
Domain 4 Economy  
Free Enterprise .614
Incentives .632
Market Regulation .609
Corporatism .330
Productivity .598
Infrastructure .680
Economic Orthodoxy .553
Marxist -.648
Domain 5 Welfare & Quality of Life 
Environmental Protectionism -.045
Culture .600
Social Justice .214
Welfare Pos .840
Education Pos .796
Domain 7 Social Groups  
Labour .343
Agricultural & Farmers .865
Minority Groups .790
Non-economic Groups .042
Note: Extraction Method: Principal components with one factor extracted 
 
The Changing Face of the Portuguese Parties            Mendes, Camões, & McDonald            29th ECPR Joint Session Workshops, Grenoble, April 6-11 
 
 
 
Table 15: Results of First Stage Factor Analysis in Both Sub-Periods  
 1975-83 1985-95 
Domains and Categories Factor Factor 
Domain 1 External Relations   
Foreign Relations Pos -.016 .836 
Internationalism Pos -.182 .674 
Military Pos .823 .810 
Military Neg -.475 -.597 
European Community Pos .875 .414 
Anti-Imperialism -.722 -.587 
Domain 2 Freedom & Democracy   
Freedom & Human Rights .066 .806 
Democracy -.724 .762 
Constitutionalism Pos .744 -.078 
Domain 3 Political System   
Centralisation & Decentralisation .610 .881 
Governmental & Adm. Efficiency .756 .403 
Political Corruption -.637 .854 
Domain 4 Economy   
Free Enterprise .714 .528 
Incentives .442 .772 
Market Regulation .695 .567 
Corporatism .532 .070 
Productivity .728 .516 
Infrastructure .519 .791 
Economic Orthodoxy .582 .523 
Marxist -.672 -.539 
Domain 5 Welfare & Quality of Life   
Environmental Protectionism .102 -.454 
Culture .733 .530 
Social Justice -.251 .747 
Welfare Pos .806 .784 
Education Pos .897 .640 
Domain 7 Social Groups   
Labour .402 .058 
Agricultural & Farmers .837 .663 
Minority Groups .718 .666 
Non-economic Groups -.349 .810 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Components with one factor extracted 
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Table 15: Results of Second Stage Factor Analysis  
 
 
 1975-95  1975-83  1985-95  
Factors from 1st Stage 1st Factor 2nd Factor 1st Factor 2nd Factor 1st Factor 2nd Factor 
D1 Good International Relations .722 .032  .835 .0003 
D1 Good European Relations .938 -.022   
D2 Democratic/Civic Freedoms -749 -.076 .433 .373 -.481 -.688 
D3 Better Government .667 -.458 .856 .088 -.177 .798 
D4 Economic Growth .868 .146 .753 .245 .745 .461 
D5 Social Concerns/Quality of Life .703 .396 .526 .711 .619 .358 
D7 Economic Groups .146 .905 -.092 .918   
D7 Poverty/Inequality Groups  .852 -.217 
Notes: Extraction Method: Eigenvalues >1.00 
Rotation Method: Varimax  
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Figure 1: Left-Right Alignment of Major Portuguese Parties According to the 
Experts 
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Figure 2: Voter Turnout in Legislative Elections by District, 1975-99 
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Figure 3: Comparison of the Counts of the Population, Persons Registered, 
and Voters, 1975-99 
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Figure 4:  Alignment of Major Portuguese Parties on Eight Policy Issues 
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Issue Domains        PCP       PS       PSD                CDS/PP  
   A.  Services vs. Taxes       3.43       8.75      14.00      17.00 
   B.  Unfriendly with USSR       1.14       7.88      13.00      15.86 
   C.  Public vs. Private Ownership      1.14       9.50      13.83      18.14 
   D.  Restrictive Social Policy       2.67       8.00      12.40      18.17 
   E.  Anti- vs. Pro-clerical       2.71       9.63      13.50      19.29 
   F.  Urban vs. Rural Interests       7.00       8.29      10.80      16.50 
   G.  Centralize Decision Making            13.83       8.57      11.60      12.50 
   H.  Environment vs. Growth       5.83       9.86      16.60      13.83 
 
 
Source: Party positions are from a survey of experts conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992, 286-91).  High 
scores represent what are usually taken to be issue positions of parties on the political right. 
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Figure 5: Relationship between Seat Percentage versus Vote Percentage 
Advantage/Disadvantage and the Level of Party Vote Percentage, Assembly 
Elections 1975-99 
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* The seat percentage versus vote percentage advantage/disadvantage is calculated as (% of Seats 
- % of Votes).  A party with an advantage has a positive score because it has received a larger 
percentage of seats compared to votes; a party with a disadvantage has a negative score because it 
has received a smaller percentage of seats compared to votes. 
 
**The breakeven point is an eyeball estimate of the vote percentage level where a party can 
expect to have neither an advantage nor a disadvantage—i.e., to breakeven. 
 
*** The lines for the PSD and the PS show the respective least squares estimates of how their 
advantages increase as the level of their vote percentages increase.  The equations are: 
 
PSD Advantage  =  -1.39  +  .153 Vote%,      with R2 = .681;  se   =  1.06 
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Figure 6: First Stage Factor Scores by Party and Election, 1975-95 
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Legend: 
Diamond=PCP; Square=PS; Triangle=PSD; X=PP 
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Figure 7: Second Stage Factor Scores 
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Figure 8: Unidimensional Portuguese Party Space using CMP Data, 1975-95 
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Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Comparative Manifestos Project Data 
of Four Major Portuguese Parties, 1975-95 
 PCP    PS    PSD    PP    
Domains and Categories Mean StD Min Max Mean StD Min Max Mean StD Min Max Mean StD Min Max 
External Relations 8.744 1.852 6.56 11.48 8.347 1.889 0 9.59 7.458 3.290 0 4.17 8.661 8.332 0 24.24 
Frgn Special Relationships 
Pos 
.611 .485 0 1.64 1.117 1.011 0 2.70 1.281 1.219 0 3.23 1.218 1.678 0 4.90 
Frgn Special Relationships 
Neg 
.019 .039 0 .11 .171 .435 0 1.31 .083 .190 0 .58 .072 .205 0 .58 
Anti-Imperialism 3.019 3.030 0 8.20 1.31 3.084 0 9.46 .248 .373 0 1.04 .178 .313 0 .89 
Military Pos .263 .411 0 1.05 .865 1.090 0 2.74 .989 1.075 0 2.80 .853 1.127 0 2.61 
Military Neg 1.450 1.799 0 5.13 .563 .951 0 2.70 .108 .183 0 .52 .194 .344 0 .98 
Peace .900 .893 0 2.46 .204 .393 0 1.19 .586 1.217 0 3.77 .485 .697 0 1.96 
Internationaliam Pos .988 .681 0 1.90 1.504 2.651 0 8.11 1.527 1.471 0 4.17 .548 .581 0 1.42 
Internationalism Neg .200 .299 0 .72 .143 .428 0 1.28 .452 .738 0 1.89 .446 .629 0 1.45 
European  Community Pos .546 1.132 0 3.11 2.469 3.058 0 9.59 2.168 1.616 0 4.16 4.155 8.199 0 24.24 
European Community Neg .749 .711 0 1.92 0 0 0 0 .016 .048 0 .14 .512 1.447 0 4.09 
 Freedom and Democracy 18.767 13.247 8.43 50.96 12.188 13.980 0 40.54 7.840 8.846 0 18.87 4.805 2.562 0 6.16 
Freedom and Human Rights 2.938 2.221 .94 8.20 1.914 2.436 0 7.14 4.020 6.088 0 18.87 1.73 1.849 0 5.05 
Democracy 12.579 12.869 5.11 46.50 7.689 12.871 0 40.54 3.176 3.241 0 9.43 2.337 2.232 0 6.16 
Constitutionalism Pos 3.250 3.621 .97 12.64 2.385 3.504 0 9.47 .261 .480 0 1.16 .486 .529 0 1.16 
Constitutionalism Neg 0 0 0 0 .200 .591 0 1.78 .383 .705 0 2.13 .808 1.050 0 2.50 
Political System 4.355 3.717 .64 10.75 8.104 4.303 0 15.48 8.533 2.946 0 27.94 11.160 4.674 0 26.79 
Decentralization 1.399 1.112 0 3.01 1.832 1.891 0 4.80 3.739 3.008 0 9.38 2.711 2.569 0 7.39 
Centralization 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Govt & Adm. Efficiency 1.539 2.271 0 6.48 5.722 2.958 0 10.30 4.681 1.735 1.04 6.52 7.304 4.311 .987 13.13 
Political Corruption 1.417 1.866 0 5.69 .550 1.194 0 3.57 .114 .138 0 .30 1.145 1.730 0 5 
Political Authority 25.564 18.662 0 47.44 7.792 5.267 1.01 15.48 8.966 9.958 0 27.94 7.949 8.771 0 26.79 
Economy 12.161 4.573 6.41 21.23 25.748 7.922 0 6.85 26.324 8.127 0 18.48 29.425 12.192 0 21.25 
Free Enterprise .258 .543 0 1.64 1.520 2.523 0 8.08 1.949 1.375 0 4.78 4.234 1.867 1.19 6.86 
Incentives 1.471 1.701 0 4.92 3.193 2.731 0 8.22 1.683 1.023 .24 3.77 1.997 1.647 .24 5.65 
Market Regulation .668 1.225 0 3.65 2.038 2.058 0 5.98 1.755 1.390 0 3.77 2.888 1.107 .71 3.92 
Economic Planning .023 .070 0 .21 .734 .792 0 1.83 .231 .392 0 1.10 .299 .373 0 1.01 
Corporatism .019 .039 0 .11 1.086 1.086 0 3.03 1.070 1.670 0 5.21 1.505 3.073 0 8.93 
Protectionism Pos .222 .277 0 .64 .258 .481 0 1.19 .066 .172 0 .52 .129 .345 0 .98 
Protectionism Neg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .162 .303 0 .87 .231 .429 0 .98 
Economic Goals 2.544 1.911 0 6.06 4.552 2.637 0 9.59 5.033 5.469 0 18.48 4.182 3.267 1.01 11.25 
Keynesian Demand 0 0 0 0 .012 .035 0 .10 0 0 0 0 .006 .018 0 .05 
Productivity 1.890 1.342 0 4.10 2.829 2.361 0 6.85 4.383 2.545 .24 8.82 2.338 2.288 0 6.25 
Techn &Infrastructure 1.567 2.170 0 5.89 5.731 3.874 0 10.83 5.570 4.559 0 13.25 4.379 3.042 .89 10.63 
Controlled Economy .201 .328 0 .81 .267 .601 0 1.83 .770 1.179 0 3.77 .530 .928 0 2.68 
Nationalization .634 .511 0 1.67 .854 1.419 0 4.05 .210 .629 0 1.89 .123 .346 0 .98 
Economic Orthodoxy .429 .542 0 1.41 1.572 2.411 0 6.85 3.443 3.3800 0 9.78 6.585 6.665 1.97 21.25 
Marxist Analysis 2.235 2.540 0 8.28 1.101 2.258 0 6.76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Anti-Growth Economy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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 PCP    PS    PSD    PP    
Domains and Categories Mean StD Min Max Mean StD Min Max Mean StD Min Max Mean StD Min Max 
Welfare & Quality of Life 14.077 13.283 0 36.00 21.602 14.090 0 30.30 23.180 6.205 0 18.87 20.906 9.987 0 11.25 
Environmental Protection 1.108 1.549 0 3.90 1.472 2.181 0 5.68 2.595 2.799 0 7.88 3.272 2.872 0 7.64 
Culture 2.801 3.055 0 7.90 1.859 2.581 0 6.51 3.450 2.795 0 7.28 2.789 2.282 0 5.98 
Social Justice 3.009 3.313 0 8.96 3.346 2.867 0 7.14 5.413 5.874 .52 18.87 4.061 3.543 0 10.19 
Welfare State Expansion 4.559 4.142 0 12.59 8.099 4.136 0 13.60 6.813 3.446 1.89 11.48 7.187 3.559 .89 11.25 
Welfare State Limitation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .229 .453 0 1.04 .127 .359 0 1.01 
Education Expansion 2.600 2.964 0 6.56 6.826 9.157 0 30.30 4.681 2.677 1.89 10.42 3.470 2.289 0 6.86 
Education Limitation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fabric of Society 1.900 1.268 .64 3.88 3.697 2.881 0 10.40 4.898 3.888 0 6.25 6.051 4.236 0 8.82 
Natl Way  of Life Pos .042 .092 0 .27 .093 .184 0 .55 .267 .437 0 1.10 .548 .753 0 1.79 
Natl Way of Life Neg .091 .273 0 .82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .112 .316 0 .89 
Traditional Morality Pos .138 .249 0 .64 .034 .090 0 .27 .779 .725 0 2.08 2.024 2.918 0 8.82 
Traditional Morality Neg .030 .062 0 .17 0 0 0 0 .008 .024 0 .07 0 0 0 0 
Law & Order .753 .698 0 1.62 2.187 3.294 0 10.40 1.886 1.925 0 6.25 1.416 1.654 0 4.61 
Social Harmony .734 .596 0 1.64 1.343 1.285 0 3.55 1.875 1.759 0 4.41 1.886 2.209 0 6.25 
Multiculturism Pos .111 .250 0 .74 .040 .083 0 .23 .083 .126 0 .29 .066 .123 0 .29 
Multiculturism Neg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Social  Groups 13.032 7.350 6.50 31.15 10.737 9.152 0 20.80 10.843 5.575 0 12.36 9.418 3.799 0 6.23 
Labour Groups Pos 5.988 2.484 4.05 11.48 4.030 2.516 1.78 8.80 1.755 2.245 0 5.66 1.323 1.545 0 4.46 
Labour Groups Neg 0 0 0 0 .019 .056 0 .17 .306 .684 0 2.08 1.237 1.813 0 4.46 
Agriculture & Farmers 3.950 4.820 .64 16.39 4.852 6.607 0 20.80 4.604 3.285 1.47 12.36 3.445 2.160 0 6.23 
Middle Class & Prof Groups .540 .744 0 1.64 .026 .057 0 .17 .046 .092 0 .22 .333 .501 0 1.25 
Minority Groups 1.235 1.042 0 2.79 .864 .901 0 2.74 1.702 2.335 0 7.51 .846 1.130 0 2.61 
Non-Econ Groups 1.320 1.245 0 3.21 .947 1.234 0 3.20 2.429 1.333 .52 4.50 2.233 2.065 0 5.88 
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Appendix Table 2: Provisional and Constitutional Governments 1974-1999  
 
Governments Election 
Date 
Govt Date Pty in Govt Governing 
Status 
Pre-Election Governments     
Palma Carlos -- 15/05/74 -- -- 
Gonçalves -- 17/07/74 -- -- 
Gonçalves -- 30/09/74 -- -- 
Gonçalves -- 26/03/75 PS, PSD, PCP, MDP -- 
Provisional Governments    
Gonçalves 04/75 08/08/75 -- -- 
Azevedo 04/75 19/09/75 PS, PSD,PCP -- 
Constitutional Governments    
Soares 04/76 23/07/76 PS Min. 
Soares 04/76 23/01/78 PSP, PP Min. 
Nobre da Costa 04/76 28/08/78 Ind.; Caretaker ---- 
Mota Pinto 04/76 21/11/78 Ind. ---- 
Pintasilgo 04/76 31/07/79 Ind.; Caretaker ---- 
Sá Carneiro 10/79 31/01/80 AD (PSD, PP, PPM) Maj. Coal. 
Pinto Balsemão 10/80 09/01/81 AD (PSD, PP,PPM) Maj. Coal. 
Pinto Balsemão 10/80 04/09/81 AD (PSD, PP, PPM) Maj. Coal. 
Pinto Balsemão 10/80 23/12/82 AD; Caretaker Min. 
Soares 04/83 09/06/83 PS, PSD Maj. Coal. 
Soares 04/83 07/83 PS Min. 
Cavaco  Silva 10/85 06/11/85 PSD Min. 
Cavaco Silva 07/87 17/08/87 PSD Maj. 
Cavaco Silva 10/91 31/10/91 PSD Maj. 
Guterres 10/95 28/10/95 PS Min. 
Guterres 10/99 25/10/99 PS Parity 
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Appendix Table 3:  Presidents of the Republic Since the First Republic, 1910 
 
Year and Republic Presidents 
I Republic (Primeira República)  
1911 Manuel de Arriaga 
1915 Bernardino Machado 
1917 Sidónio Pais 
1918 Canto e Castro 
1919 António José de Almeida 
1923 Teixeira Gomes 
1925 Bernardino Machado 
II Republic (Estado Novo)  
1928 Oscar Fragoso Carmona 
1951 Craveiro Lópes 
1958 Américo Tomás 
III Republic (Democracia)  
1974 António Spínola 
1974 Costa Gomes 
1976 Ramalho Eanes 
1980 Ramalho Eanes 
1986 Mário Soares 
1991 Mário Soares 
1996 Jorge Sampaio 
2001 Jorge Sampaio 
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Appendix Table 4: Existing, Active,& Extinct Portuguese Political Parties Since 1974 
 
Party  Party Name Partic. in Last Election 
 Existing  
BE Left Block—PSR, PXXI, & UDP X 
CDS/PP Popular Party X 
CDU; PCPPEV Unitary Democratic Coalition X 
MPT Earth Party Movement X 
PCTP/MRPP Communist Party of Portuguese Workers  X 
PDA Democratic Party of the Atlantic X 
PH Humanist Party X 
POUS Socialist Unity Worker’s Party X 
PSD Social Democratic Party X 
PPM Monarchic Popular Party X 
PS Socialist Party X 
PSN National Solidarity Party  
FER Revolutionary Left Front  
FSP Popular Socialist Front  
PCP Portuguese Communist Party X 
PDC Party of the Christian Democracy  
PEV Ecologist Party ‘The Greens’  
PNR National Renewal Party   
PSR Revolutionary Socialist Party  
PXXI Politics XXI  
UDP Popular Democratic Union  
 Extinct  
AD Democratic Alliance  
AOC Agrarian Operative Association  
APU United People Alliance  
ASDI Independent Social Democratic Action  
FEC Communist Electoral Front  
FEPU Electoral Front United People  
FRS Republican and Socialist Front  
FUP Popular Unity Force  
GDUP Dynamic Group of  Popular Unity   
LGI Internationalist Communist League  
LST Socialist League of Workers  
MDP/CDE Portuguese Democratic Movement  
MES Socialist Left Movement   
MIRN/PDP National Reconstruction Independent Movement  
MUT Unity of Workers Movement  
OCMLP Portuguese Communist Marxist Leninist Organization  
PCR Reconstructed Communist Party  
PCP (ML) Portuguese Communist Party (Marxist Leninist)  
PG People Party  
PPR Religious Portuguese Party  
PRD Renewal Democratic Party  
PRT Workers´ Revolutionary Party  
PT Labour Party  
PUP Popular Unity Party  
UEDS Socialist Democratic Left Union  
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Appendix Table 5: Official Status of Parties, 2000 
   
 
 Requirements to/for:   
Parliamentary 
Fraction 
Ballot State Subvention Media 
Access 
    
None Candidates are presented by the parties, 
independently or in coalition.  They must be 
registered by the beginning of the deadline to 
present the candidates. The party lists may 
include citizens that are not registered in the 
party. Coalitions of parties are allowed if 
submitted to the Constitutional Court.  
In each of the 20 electoral districts, the lists of 
candidates are submitted to the Court 41 days 
before the day of election.   
Annual and 
proportional to the 
number of votes 
given to the parties 
with seats in 
Assembly of the 
Republic; 
Regulated by 
the National 
Elections 
Commission 
(CNE). 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
